Today's news seems somewhat hopeful.
It isn't clear how it came about, but it sounds like Secretary of State Kerry may have proposed a settlement believing Syria would refuse - and now both Syria and Russia are jumping through hoops as fast as they can to accept it.
The proposal that Syria turn over its chemical weapons to international control is a good one. It was made even better when Russia suggested the weapons be destroyed under international supervision.
Doing this would resolve a potential dilemma: should there be a strike against Syria's chemical weapons depots? On the one hand, that would be the most justifiable target. On the other hand, attacking the chemical weapons would likely release some very nasty stuff into the Syrian countryside - possibly causing innocent deaths.
President Theodore Roosevelt is often quoted as advising that we "speak softly and carry a big stick."
George W. Bush's neocons seemed to think that meant "shout loudly and hit people over the head with the stick."
Sometimes diplomacy can accomplish wonders, but it is hard work best accomplished behind the scenes.
I hope that's what's going on here.
Showing posts with label diplomatic. Show all posts
Showing posts with label diplomatic. Show all posts
Monday, September 9, 2013
Sunday, September 1, 2013
What About Syria?
The subject of Syria keeps coming up at The Bean. "What do I think?"
I shy away from the subject. The truth is, I know a lot about warfare (it's my profession), but I don't know much about Syria.
I also know a lot about diplomacy, international law and strategic planning. But what I know of these subjects leads me to be cautious. Especially when the action under review is to become involved in someone else's civil war. Danger!
I also don't think much of the idea that we can just bomb a country into submission without some form of "boots on the ground." Or at least the threat of "boots on the ground." * And be sceptical of "regime change" as a goal. We're still suffering the aftereffects of our ill-considered "successful" operation of sixty years ago, where we caused the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected, progressive prime minister of Iran.
We saved Iranian oil for British Petroleum, but at what cost?
Worth thinking about.
*The only case that comes to mind of a successful military campaign won almost entirely by bombing is that of Kosovo in 1999.
I shy away from the subject. The truth is, I know a lot about warfare (it's my profession), but I don't know much about Syria.
I also know a lot about diplomacy, international law and strategic planning. But what I know of these subjects leads me to be cautious. Especially when the action under review is to become involved in someone else's civil war. Danger!
I also don't think much of the idea that we can just bomb a country into submission without some form of "boots on the ground." Or at least the threat of "boots on the ground." * And be sceptical of "regime change" as a goal. We're still suffering the aftereffects of our ill-considered "successful" operation of sixty years ago, where we caused the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected, progressive prime minister of Iran.
We saved Iranian oil for British Petroleum, but at what cost?
Worth thinking about.
*The only case that comes to mind of a successful military campaign won almost entirely by bombing is that of Kosovo in 1999.
Friday, May 10, 2013
Why Did The Soviet Union Fall Apart?
Over the past two decades, several inaccurate narratives have dominated public discourse about the former Soviet Union's demise.
The first narrative is that President Reagan ordered Mikhail Gorbachov to "tear down this wall" and the Berlin Wall came down. Kind of like Joshua's trumpet.
The second narrative is that the Soviet Union fell apart because of the failure of Central Planning, also known as the "Command Economy."
Both narratives appeal to widespread prejudices rather than objective evaluation of both the accomplishments and the failures of the Soviet system. Contributing to both successes and failures was the complexity of the "nationality question" during both the Soviet period and during the preexisting Russian Empire.
Following the Russian Civil War and the Polish invasion of Russia, Lenin introduced his "New Economic Policy" (NEP). NEP allowed a considerable amount of free enterprise, including farming. It apparently worked pretty well. But the leadership became rightfully concerned about increasing turmoil in Europe and began the collectivization campaign at least in part to support the Soviet Union's ability to mobilize its natural resources for war. Any examination of Soviet economic policy during that period has to address such questions as whether NEP could plausibly have prepared for war with Germany.
As for the larger issue of the Command Economy, economic historian Brad DeLong recently posted an essay of his from seventeen years ago, examining the corporation as a command economy. This is a good corrective to analyses that draw large distinctions between Western industry and Soviet Central Planning.
Many years ago, I attended a lecture by Alexander Kerensky, the second Prime Minister of the Russian Provisional Government of 1917, which was overthrown by the Bolshevik Revolution of October. Kerensky contended that the Soviet Union's economy was not a Socialist one, but an example of what he called "State Capitalism." He autographed a copy of his book, which is still in my library. It may be worth rereading.
It is time to take another look at the issues presented by seventy-five years of Soviet history.
The first narrative is that President Reagan ordered Mikhail Gorbachov to "tear down this wall" and the Berlin Wall came down. Kind of like Joshua's trumpet.
The second narrative is that the Soviet Union fell apart because of the failure of Central Planning, also known as the "Command Economy."
Both narratives appeal to widespread prejudices rather than objective evaluation of both the accomplishments and the failures of the Soviet system. Contributing to both successes and failures was the complexity of the "nationality question" during both the Soviet period and during the preexisting Russian Empire.
Following the Russian Civil War and the Polish invasion of Russia, Lenin introduced his "New Economic Policy" (NEP). NEP allowed a considerable amount of free enterprise, including farming. It apparently worked pretty well. But the leadership became rightfully concerned about increasing turmoil in Europe and began the collectivization campaign at least in part to support the Soviet Union's ability to mobilize its natural resources for war. Any examination of Soviet economic policy during that period has to address such questions as whether NEP could plausibly have prepared for war with Germany.
As for the larger issue of the Command Economy, economic historian Brad DeLong recently posted an essay of his from seventeen years ago, examining the corporation as a command economy. This is a good corrective to analyses that draw large distinctions between Western industry and Soviet Central Planning.
Many years ago, I attended a lecture by Alexander Kerensky, the second Prime Minister of the Russian Provisional Government of 1917, which was overthrown by the Bolshevik Revolution of October. Kerensky contended that the Soviet Union's economy was not a Socialist one, but an example of what he called "State Capitalism." He autographed a copy of his book, which is still in my library. It may be worth rereading.
It is time to take another look at the issues presented by seventy-five years of Soviet history.
Monday, March 18, 2013
1968: Perfidy In DC
Lyndon Johnson had the goods on Richard Nixon. But he couldn't use it.
The Democratic Party convention in Chicago was a disaster. Johnson even considered appearing at the last minute and putting his name forward for nomination.
Bad idea.
Peace talks were going on in Paris, and North Vietnam had made a promising offer.
Richard Nixon feared that prospects for peace would scuttle his campaign. He sent Anna Chennault as his intermediary with the South Vietnamese ambassador, pleading with them to put off negotiations and wait for a better deal after the election.
The FBI bugged Chennault and the National Security Agency monitored the Ambassador's communications with Saigon.
Johnson knew what was going on. In private he called it treason. But he couldn't make it public without revealing the monitoring. It's generally considered bad form to bug embassies and read ambassadorial communications - and to reveal it in public.
Of course, it's even worse form not to monitor and to get caught flat footed.
So Johnson kept his mouth shut in public.
Nixon won by less than 1%. Had Nixon's perfidy become public, he may well have lost by a landslide.
Here is the story. All captured on Lyndon Johnson's White House tapes.
It wouldn't be the last time a presidential candidate meddled in international negotiations to the detriment of national interests. It may well have been the last time such actions were so clearly documented.
The Democratic Party convention in Chicago was a disaster. Johnson even considered appearing at the last minute and putting his name forward for nomination.
Bad idea.
Peace talks were going on in Paris, and North Vietnam had made a promising offer.
Richard Nixon feared that prospects for peace would scuttle his campaign. He sent Anna Chennault as his intermediary with the South Vietnamese ambassador, pleading with them to put off negotiations and wait for a better deal after the election.
The FBI bugged Chennault and the National Security Agency monitored the Ambassador's communications with Saigon.
Johnson knew what was going on. In private he called it treason. But he couldn't make it public without revealing the monitoring. It's generally considered bad form to bug embassies and read ambassadorial communications - and to reveal it in public.
Of course, it's even worse form not to monitor and to get caught flat footed.
So Johnson kept his mouth shut in public.
Nixon won by less than 1%. Had Nixon's perfidy become public, he may well have lost by a landslide.
Here is the story. All captured on Lyndon Johnson's White House tapes.
It wouldn't be the last time a presidential candidate meddled in international negotiations to the detriment of national interests. It may well have been the last time such actions were so clearly documented.
Thursday, February 28, 2013
Drones, War and Moral Hazard
There has been a lot of discussion by talking heads and writing (by writing heads?) recently about drones. And not just against terrorists. It almost sound like our domestic airspace will soon be full of drones.
Let's give some thought to what we are about. I'm not sure that dressing game console operators up in flight suits, paying them "incentive pay" (we used to call it flight pay), calling them "pilots" and giving them hero medals is what we should be doing.
What I think I'm hearing is a lot of relatively naive talk about "killing the bad guys" though it might be couched in more sophisticated verbiage.
In the popular imagination, war is about killing as many of our opponents as possible. In the professional imagination, Karl von Klausewitz was closer to the mark when he explained that "war is politics by other, namely violent means." What he means, is that there must be a point to what we do beyond killing "the bad guys."
War is not completely separate from diplomacy, either. I think presidential scholar Richard Neustadt got it about right a half century ago when he described the task of diplomacy as to convince enough people and the right people on the other side that what you want is what they also want, in order to further their own interest.
Some sources of human conflict are best moderated with deterrence, some with "compellance," and some with negotiation. Wisdom lies in knowing when. And to what end.
Violence, in the long run, is not a way of resolving human conflict. In international affairs, it is at best like the two by four the farmer hits the mule with. "That's to get it's attention," the farmer explains.
Once you get the opponent's attention, maybe it's best to sit down and reason together.
Back to the subject of drones. And moral hazard.
Let me repeat some earlier thoughts.
Economists talk about "moral hazard." This refers to a situation where there is a tendency to take undue risks because the costs are not borne by the party taking the risk. Like financial wizards who take in enormous bonuses just before the crash and leaves it to the rest of the country to pick up the pieces. We should extend the concept to war.
In 1941 and 1942 the attacking forces faced at least as much risk as those being attacked. This was true at Pearl Harbor, at Bataan and Corregidor, in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and countless other battles.
It is usually not true of the political leaders who order a country to war. They do not bear the risks that face the military forces.
The equation of risk becomes distorted forever when attacks are conducted from halfway around the world by skilled gamers who sit in front of computers and direct robotic drones to destroy targets and people. It is the inhabitants of target areas who bear the risk.
Is this a kind of moral risk we are willing to take?
As a professional military officer, I always wanted to minimize the risk to my own sailors. At what point does this kind of planning cross a moral divide?
Apart from moral considerations, we may need to think about the message we convey. Is the message that our cause is not worth risking an American life? If so, we should say so. But we need to ask ourselves the question - if a cause is not worth dying for, is it worth killing for?
Let's give some thought to what we are about. I'm not sure that dressing game console operators up in flight suits, paying them "incentive pay" (we used to call it flight pay), calling them "pilots" and giving them hero medals is what we should be doing.
What I think I'm hearing is a lot of relatively naive talk about "killing the bad guys" though it might be couched in more sophisticated verbiage.
In the popular imagination, war is about killing as many of our opponents as possible. In the professional imagination, Karl von Klausewitz was closer to the mark when he explained that "war is politics by other, namely violent means." What he means, is that there must be a point to what we do beyond killing "the bad guys."
War is not completely separate from diplomacy, either. I think presidential scholar Richard Neustadt got it about right a half century ago when he described the task of diplomacy as to convince enough people and the right people on the other side that what you want is what they also want, in order to further their own interest.
Some sources of human conflict are best moderated with deterrence, some with "compellance," and some with negotiation. Wisdom lies in knowing when. And to what end.
Violence, in the long run, is not a way of resolving human conflict. In international affairs, it is at best like the two by four the farmer hits the mule with. "That's to get it's attention," the farmer explains.
Once you get the opponent's attention, maybe it's best to sit down and reason together.
Back to the subject of drones. And moral hazard.
Let me repeat some earlier thoughts.
Economists talk about "moral hazard." This refers to a situation where there is a tendency to take undue risks because the costs are not borne by the party taking the risk. Like financial wizards who take in enormous bonuses just before the crash and leaves it to the rest of the country to pick up the pieces. We should extend the concept to war.
In 1941 and 1942 the attacking forces faced at least as much risk as those being attacked. This was true at Pearl Harbor, at Bataan and Corregidor, in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and countless other battles.
It is usually not true of the political leaders who order a country to war. They do not bear the risks that face the military forces.
The equation of risk becomes distorted forever when attacks are conducted from halfway around the world by skilled gamers who sit in front of computers and direct robotic drones to destroy targets and people. It is the inhabitants of target areas who bear the risk.
Is this a kind of moral risk we are willing to take?
As a professional military officer, I always wanted to minimize the risk to my own sailors. At what point does this kind of planning cross a moral divide?
Apart from moral considerations, we may need to think about the message we convey. Is the message that our cause is not worth risking an American life? If so, we should say so. But we need to ask ourselves the question - if a cause is not worth dying for, is it worth killing for?
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
Kissinger On China
Walter Pincus has a very good article in today's Washington Post summarizing former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's observations on China.
Those of us who took Kissinger's seminar on national security policy at Harvard referred to him as "Henry the K." A few days after Richard Nixon won the presidential election and announced that Kissinger would be his national security adviser, seminar students arrived to find television video equipment crowding the classroom. "Pay no attention to the cameras," Kissinger advised his class, "it's good for my megalomania."
He was joking.
The seminar might have been titled "prominent guest of the week," because Professor Kissinger invited prominent academic and government figures to speak at his seminar. One week it might be Robert McNamara. The next week might be Tom Schilling. Then the sequence of prominent guests would be interrupted by one or two lectures given by Professor Kissinger himself. Those lectures were always the most focused and informative of all.
I didn't always view Kissinger's observations on European affairs as especially wise. Nor was I overly impressed with his views on the Soviet Union.
Based on Pincus' article, however, I view Kissinger as expressing great wisdom about China. In a talk at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Kissinger related discussions with each Chinese leader from Mao Tse Tung [I know the spelling has changed], including with the most probable new leader, Xi Jinping. Kissinger believes Xi Jinping will seek such enormous internal changes that “it’s unlikely that in 10 years the next generation will come into office with exactly the same institutions that exist today.
“This is one reason why I do not believe that great foreign adventures or confrontations with the United States can be on their agenda,” Kissinger said. But because Xi faces the need to make difficult domestic changes, he may be more assertive in responding to foreign critics, he added.
“What we must not demand or expect is that they will follow the mechanisms with which we are more familiar. It will be a Chinese version . . . and it will not be achieved without some domestic difficulties.”
Wise remarks.
Those of us who took Kissinger's seminar on national security policy at Harvard referred to him as "Henry the K." A few days after Richard Nixon won the presidential election and announced that Kissinger would be his national security adviser, seminar students arrived to find television video equipment crowding the classroom. "Pay no attention to the cameras," Kissinger advised his class, "it's good for my megalomania."
He was joking.
The seminar might have been titled "prominent guest of the week," because Professor Kissinger invited prominent academic and government figures to speak at his seminar. One week it might be Robert McNamara. The next week might be Tom Schilling. Then the sequence of prominent guests would be interrupted by one or two lectures given by Professor Kissinger himself. Those lectures were always the most focused and informative of all.
I didn't always view Kissinger's observations on European affairs as especially wise. Nor was I overly impressed with his views on the Soviet Union.
Based on Pincus' article, however, I view Kissinger as expressing great wisdom about China. In a talk at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Kissinger related discussions with each Chinese leader from Mao Tse Tung [I know the spelling has changed], including with the most probable new leader, Xi Jinping. Kissinger believes Xi Jinping will seek such enormous internal changes that “it’s unlikely that in 10 years the next generation will come into office with exactly the same institutions that exist today.
“This is one reason why I do not believe that great foreign adventures or confrontations with the United States can be on their agenda,” Kissinger said. But because Xi faces the need to make difficult domestic changes, he may be more assertive in responding to foreign critics, he added.
“What we must not demand or expect is that they will follow the mechanisms with which we are more familiar. It will be a Chinese version . . . and it will not be achieved without some domestic difficulties.”
Wise remarks.
Tuesday, May 1, 2012
Liberty
I just finished reading The Attack On The Liberty by James Scott.
The book is a troubling reminder of the deliberate, sustained and unprovoked attack by coordinated air and naval forces of the state of Israel on USS Liberty, AGTR-5, a converted World War II merchant ship of the Victory class. The attack, which occurred in international waters near Egypt June 8, 1967, killed 34 US sailors and wounded 170 others, out of a crew of 300.
For comparison, when an Iraqi pilot under Saddam Hussein fired an Exocet missile at USS Stark May 17, 1987, 37 sailors died. When Al-qaida conducted a suicide attack against USS Cole October 12, 2000, 17 sailors died.
In the case of Liberty, loss of life could have been much greater except for heroic efforts by all of her surviving sailors, but especially her medical officer, Dr. Richard Kiepfer and her Damage Control Assistant, Ensign John Scott, who managed to keep the ship afloat after devastating damage from an Israeli torpedo.
Israel, which admitted the attack and issued an apology, has never provided a believable account of why the attack occurred.
James Scott, the author, is the son of Ensign John Scott, who kept the ship afloat.
The book is a troubling reminder of the deliberate, sustained and unprovoked attack by coordinated air and naval forces of the state of Israel on USS Liberty, AGTR-5, a converted World War II merchant ship of the Victory class. The attack, which occurred in international waters near Egypt June 8, 1967, killed 34 US sailors and wounded 170 others, out of a crew of 300.
For comparison, when an Iraqi pilot under Saddam Hussein fired an Exocet missile at USS Stark May 17, 1987, 37 sailors died. When Al-qaida conducted a suicide attack against USS Cole October 12, 2000, 17 sailors died.
In the case of Liberty, loss of life could have been much greater except for heroic efforts by all of her surviving sailors, but especially her medical officer, Dr. Richard Kiepfer and her Damage Control Assistant, Ensign John Scott, who managed to keep the ship afloat after devastating damage from an Israeli torpedo.
Israel, which admitted the attack and issued an apology, has never provided a believable account of why the attack occurred.
James Scott, the author, is the son of Ensign John Scott, who kept the ship afloat.
Saturday, March 17, 2012
Cut And Run Strategy - History
It's a bit disconcerting to hear various leaders talk about how important it is to leave behind a stable government in Afghanistan.
Just how are we going to do that?
Our record of accomplishment in nation building (in other people's nations) isn't all that sterling. We ran the Philippines for half a century, for example, and more than six decades after we turned the government over to the Philippinos, the country has yet to become a showcase of democracy.
That wasn't President McKinley's promise when we decided to occupy the country.
Take Vietnam. We decided in 1946 to assist France in its reoccupation of French Indo-China (as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were then called). That didn't turn out well. In 1954, at the time of Dien Bien Phu, President Eisenhower decided against direct intervention, but we provided advisers and lots of equipment. In 1961 Kennedy sent even more advisers and equipment. By 1965, we owned the war.
In 1973, President Nixon withdrew the last American troops. In 1975, North Vietnamese forces conquered the entire country.
Upshot: after thirty years of war, loss of nearly 60,000 US servicemen and millions of Vietnamese lives, we achieved the same outcome that had been available in 1946 at virtually no cost.
There are times when it is best to stop throwing good money (and lives) after bad. But deciding to do so after the nation has made a commitment is hard to do.
Still, withdrawal always has to remain an option. It was Senator Aiken of Vermont, I believe, who advised President Johnson to just "declare victory" and bring the boys (they were mostly male warriors then) home.
Good advice.
Just how are we going to do that?
Our record of accomplishment in nation building (in other people's nations) isn't all that sterling. We ran the Philippines for half a century, for example, and more than six decades after we turned the government over to the Philippinos, the country has yet to become a showcase of democracy.
That wasn't President McKinley's promise when we decided to occupy the country.
Take Vietnam. We decided in 1946 to assist France in its reoccupation of French Indo-China (as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were then called). That didn't turn out well. In 1954, at the time of Dien Bien Phu, President Eisenhower decided against direct intervention, but we provided advisers and lots of equipment. In 1961 Kennedy sent even more advisers and equipment. By 1965, we owned the war.
In 1973, President Nixon withdrew the last American troops. In 1975, North Vietnamese forces conquered the entire country.
Upshot: after thirty years of war, loss of nearly 60,000 US servicemen and millions of Vietnamese lives, we achieved the same outcome that had been available in 1946 at virtually no cost.
There are times when it is best to stop throwing good money (and lives) after bad. But deciding to do so after the nation has made a commitment is hard to do.
Still, withdrawal always has to remain an option. It was Senator Aiken of Vermont, I believe, who advised President Johnson to just "declare victory" and bring the boys (they were mostly male warriors then) home.
Good advice.
Monday, March 12, 2012
White Man's Burden II?
I spent my adult life in defense of democracy. Not because our own democracy is perfect, but because it has the chance of standing up to various forms of authoritarianism and despotism. I was not an anticommunist crusader. I did support the late George Frost Kennan's approach of defending American interests by containing Soviet power.
At the same time, I agreed with the late Marshall Shulman's view of the Soviet-American conflict as a "limited adversary relationship," not an apocalyptic one.
Through all of the Cold War period, I never thought the United States had an obligation to establish democratic regimes in other countries. Not our job. Beyond our power.
My entire life has been spent against a backdrop of war and rumors of war. But the most important efforts in defense of democracy have been right here in the USA.
Authoritarianism and despotism continually lurk in the wings. And they have deep pockets.
The overwhelming question was raised by Abraham Lincoln: can a nation "of the people, by the people and for the people" long endure. The "existential threat" so frequently mentioned by the G.W. Bush administration, comes not from abroad, but just as in 1861, it comes from ourselves.
These thoughts are pondered in the somber light of the actions by an American sergeant in Afghanistan. That sergeant's systematic murder of sixteen Afghan citizens in their beds for no apparent reason highlights the tensions between our servicemen and local residents in Afghanistan.
Here, in an article by David Rieff, is one of the most thoughtful and thought-provoking examinations of our proper role in the world I have seen recently. It's worth reading and pondering.
Maybe it's time to bring our forces home.
At the same time, I agreed with the late Marshall Shulman's view of the Soviet-American conflict as a "limited adversary relationship," not an apocalyptic one.
Through all of the Cold War period, I never thought the United States had an obligation to establish democratic regimes in other countries. Not our job. Beyond our power.
My entire life has been spent against a backdrop of war and rumors of war. But the most important efforts in defense of democracy have been right here in the USA.
Authoritarianism and despotism continually lurk in the wings. And they have deep pockets.
The overwhelming question was raised by Abraham Lincoln: can a nation "of the people, by the people and for the people" long endure. The "existential threat" so frequently mentioned by the G.W. Bush administration, comes not from abroad, but just as in 1861, it comes from ourselves.
These thoughts are pondered in the somber light of the actions by an American sergeant in Afghanistan. That sergeant's systematic murder of sixteen Afghan citizens in their beds for no apparent reason highlights the tensions between our servicemen and local residents in Afghanistan.
Here, in an article by David Rieff, is one of the most thoughtful and thought-provoking examinations of our proper role in the world I have seen recently. It's worth reading and pondering.
Maybe it's time to bring our forces home.
Thursday, January 12, 2012
Hungary Update
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban seems well on his way to turning Hungary into an authoritarian dictatorship. In an earlier post, I suggested Hungary was beginning to resemble the authoritarian regime of Admiral Horthy, who led Hungary from 1922 to 1944.
That was a good guess. Viktor Orban himself has called attention to Horthy as a model. The latest report from Hungary by Professor Scheppele is not good. The most hopeful sign is that the EU is calling Hungary to task. Whether the EU's measures will work any better than the timid measures taken by the League of Nations in the 1920's and 1930's is anybody's guess.
What seems clear is that the events in Hungary are a serious threat to democracy in Europe.
That was a good guess. Viktor Orban himself has called attention to Horthy as a model. The latest report from Hungary by Professor Scheppele is not good. The most hopeful sign is that the EU is calling Hungary to task. Whether the EU's measures will work any better than the timid measures taken by the League of Nations in the 1920's and 1930's is anybody's guess.
What seems clear is that the events in Hungary are a serious threat to democracy in Europe.
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
Fourteen Part Message, Dec. 6, 1941
At 7:20 a.m. Saturday, December 6, 1941, a Navy intercept station near Seattle intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, announcing that the situation had become very delicate and that Japan would shortly send a fourteen-part message in reply to Secretary of State Cordell Hull's memorandum of November 26.
Soon afterward, beginning at 8:05 Seattle time, the message began arriving, in Japan's diplomatic code, known to American cryptographers as "purple." The intercept station had received the first thirteen parts by 11:52 a.m. By midafternoon, the thirteen parts had been sent to Washington, where Navy cryptographers (OP-20G) began breaking the message.
The fourteenth and final part was intercepted at 2:38 a.m. Sunday, December 7, decrypted and delivered to the White House about 9:45. At 4:37 another intercept directed Nomura to deliver the message to Hull precisely at 1:00 p.m. Washington time, and an intercept at 5:07 directed the embassy to destroy all remaining codes, ciphers and secret documents in the Japanese embassy.
The embassy had already discharged all of its locally hired typists. While frantically trying to destroy classified material, inexperienced foreign service officers had to type the documents into proper diplomatic form.
They missed the delivery deadline.
Unsuspected by the Japanese, President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull had already read the Japanese response well before Nomura called on Hull to deliver it. Apparently the "time of delivery" and code destruction intercepts were not delivered to the president until after news of the attack had reached Washington, though General Marshall attempted to warn General Short and Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor about the two messages. That communication didn't reach its destination until after the attack.
Soon afterward, beginning at 8:05 Seattle time, the message began arriving, in Japan's diplomatic code, known to American cryptographers as "purple." The intercept station had received the first thirteen parts by 11:52 a.m. By midafternoon, the thirteen parts had been sent to Washington, where Navy cryptographers (OP-20G) began breaking the message.
The fourteenth and final part was intercepted at 2:38 a.m. Sunday, December 7, decrypted and delivered to the White House about 9:45. At 4:37 another intercept directed Nomura to deliver the message to Hull precisely at 1:00 p.m. Washington time, and an intercept at 5:07 directed the embassy to destroy all remaining codes, ciphers and secret documents in the Japanese embassy.
The embassy had already discharged all of its locally hired typists. While frantically trying to destroy classified material, inexperienced foreign service officers had to type the documents into proper diplomatic form.
They missed the delivery deadline.
Unsuspected by the Japanese, President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull had already read the Japanese response well before Nomura called on Hull to deliver it. Apparently the "time of delivery" and code destruction intercepts were not delivered to the president until after news of the attack had reached Washington, though General Marshall attempted to warn General Short and Admiral Kimmel in Pearl Harbor about the two messages. That communication didn't reach its destination until after the attack.
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