Seventy Years Ago: Productive And Obstructive Admirals

In previous posts, I have expressed some views about the nation's military leadership and preparedness for war in 1941. As a young boy, I had seen some of the army's preparations with my own eyes.

Looking at contemporary documents from the vantage point of a naval career of my own and the perspective of seven decades, my judgements may carry some weight. I came to know many who served in the Pacific war. Here are some judgements:

Attack On Pearl Harbor:

Was the Pacific Fleet ready for war? You bet. Were the officers and sailors in "peacetime liberty mode?" Not on your life. About ninety percent of the sailors and sixty percent of officers were on board their ships. The first antiaircraft rounds were fired about four minutes after the unexpected attack began. Anyone with a lick of naval experience would say that speaks for crews who were well-trained and ready.

Admiral Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, was charged with preparing that fleet to go on the offensive against Japan. He did so. The navy's successes during the first six months of conflict were accomplished by ships, planes and submarines he prepared for battle.

Admiral Kimmel was not derelict in his duties. It was foolish of Washington to relieve Kimmel of his command, not because it was unjust (though it was), but because it materially hindered the effort to go on the offensive. Case in point: Admiral Pye (who relieved Kimmel December 17th) dithered over orders to the Saratoga task force sent by Kimmel to relieve Wake Island. The force proceeded at twelve knots (so as not to outrun their fleet oiler) instead of proceeding at twenty or twenty-five knots. Result: Japanese got their first and Pye called the force back. The wisdom of this remains controversial. I doubt Kimmel would have held the force back.

How about the Army? The Army on Oahu had early prototype radar sets as early as June, and an officer trained in procedures to replicate British radar successes during the Battle of Britain. The island lacked communications, radar tracking procedures and organization. Only the island commander, General Short, could have provided those resources. The radar equipment could have been used to warn the fleet and Army bases a good forty-five minutes ahead of the attack. Interceptors could have been at altitude ready to pounce on attackers. Ships would have been at general quarters, all guns manned and ready.

As it was, about eight percent of Admiral Nagumo's planes did not return from the two attack waves, and Nagumo feared even heavier losses had he launched a third.

Short didn't do his job and should have been sacked. He would probably have been suitable to run an infantry training base back in the states, but not for front line command.

The Chief of Naval Operations was a smart mediocrity  who lacked the breadth and depth needed for the job. He allowed himself to be dominated by his director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who persuaded him to keep vital intelligence information from Kimmel. Turner insisted that HE, and not the Director of Naval Intelligence, had the authority to evaluate intelligence.

Even after Kimmel had been relieved at least in part as a consequence of Turner's actions, Turner did his best to dispute the conclusions of Admiral Nimitz' communications intelligence team in the runup to the Battle of Midway. Had Turner prevailed, the US would have lost at Midway, possibly as badly as at Pearl Harbor.

Later, RK Turner was sent back to sea as commander of the Amphibious Force supporting the invasion of Guadalcanal. Not only was Turner's planning inadequate (he didn't rehearse the landing in enough detail to foresee the difficulty unloading cargo and clearing it off the beach), his lack of clarity in orders to the screening force may have led to the disastrous loss of heavy cruisers at the Battle of Savo Island. It was a fiasco, and Turner was responsible. How so?
1. He didn't bother telling the Officer in Tactical Command, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, of his troubles unloading. As a result, Fletcher withdrew his three aircraft carriers further from the objective area than he might otherwise have done;
2. Unlike other flag officers, Turner refused to have a communicatiions intelligence detachment aboard his flagship. Result: insufficient early warning of Admiral Mikawa's force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one destroyer, who attacked Turner's six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Some of Turner's ships had radar. None of Mikawa's did.

OK, so I don't admire Turner.

Anyone else on my list of screw ups? Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie, Rear Admiral Robert Henry English, and Rear Admiral H.P. Blandy. These were the officers most directly responsible for denying reports of problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and obstructing efforts to test and correct them. Christie was in charge of developing the torpedo, which eventually was found to run ten feet too deep, to have an ineffective magnetic sensor, and to have a defective contact exploder. Permanent fixes were not accomplished until after all three officers were replaced. Blandy went on to have a distinguished career, retiring as an Admiral.

Now for the attaboys:

RADM Charles Lockwood. As Commander Submarines, Pacific, he defied the Bureau of Ordinance, tested the Mark 14 torpedoes and devised fixes;

RADM Willis A. "Ching" Lee, Commander Battleship Division 6 in the Battle of Guadalcanal, 14-15 November, 1942. Used radar at night to destroy Japanese Battleship Kirishima, the only US battleship during World War II to sink an enemy battleship in a "one on one" gunfight. It was Lee's careful but audacious planning as well as his complete understanding of radar that led to the victory;

VADM Frank Jack Fletcher. Never achieved the fame he deserved. No PR. Forces under his tactical command sank six Japanese carriers. Fletcher, a "black shoe" (non-aviator) was the war's most successful carrier task group commander.

I won't mention Leahy, King, Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance. They are too well known.