Primary Election May 8

Don't forget to vote today.

Let every citizen vote.

Let every vote be counted.

May 7, 1942: Coral Sea Confusion

As dawn broke in the Coral Sea, Japanese and American commanders, seeking the wherebouts of their opponents, launched scout planes. Erroneous reports, misidentifications and a lot of to-ing and fro-ing.

Japanese scouts spotted the fleet oiler Neosho and her escorts, mistaking them for a carrier and a cruiser. The Japanese admiral launched an attack with all available aircraft. Neosho was sunk. American planes spotted the Port Moresby invasion force, with a small escort carrier, Shoho. Lexington aircraft attacked and sunk Shoho, thinking it was one of the main Japanese carriers, Shokaku or Zuikaku.

Japanese planes finally found American carriers after dark when some returning planes tried to land on an American carrier. They learned their error when they were fired on by antiaircraft guns.

A frustrating day for both sides.

America's World War II Readiness

One of the reasons I have been posting information about the early months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is to examine that aspect of the "standard narrative" that claims the United States was "unprepared" for war.

I'm not even sure what someone might mean by that claim. Unprepared in what way? Unprepared by service? Unprepared across all military platforms or only some of them? Inadequate logistics? Inadequate training? Poor morale?

Years ago, reading details of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I was struck by the fact that on a peaceful Sunday morning in a tropical paradise, when attacked without warning, the sailors on those ships during holiday routine manned their battle stations and managed to fire their antiaircraft weapons during an attack that lasted only five minutes. Their defensive fire during the second attack wave was so improved that Admiral Nagumo considered that as one reason not to launch a third wave.

Those sailors were prepared. During the cold war era, I would have been satisfied if all stations reported manned and ready within five minutes after sounding general quarters.

There were specific shortcomings in intelligence and weapons. The most notorious was the failure of our Mark 14 submarine torpedoes to perform as designed. It was clearly penny wise and pound foolish to build marvelous fleet submarines at great expense and then scrimp on testing their principal weapon.

But for the most part our ships and planes were superbly designed and built and their crews well trained.

A really good area for comparison between the United States and Japan is to look at their respective pilot training programs. Here is a very illuminating article on that subject. In brief, though Japan started the war with superb, experienced pilots, our pilots were very good and flew well-designed, rugged airplanes. The zeros were more maneuverable than their US Navy and Army counterparts at the outset, but they were also flimsier.

My conclusion is that we were quite well prepared for WWII.

Battle Of The Coral Sea: Chart

May 6, 1942: Coral Sea

On 6 May, VADM Fletcher combined Lexington (TF 11) and the cruiser/destroyer force into TF 17 (Yorktown). He believed the Japanese carriers were well to the north near Bougainville. Reconnaissance patrols failed to locate any of the Japanese naval forces, because they were located beyond scouting range.


At 10:00, a Kawanishi reconnaissance flying boat from Tulagi sighted TF 17 and notified its headquarters. Takagi received the report at 10:50. At that time, Takagi's force was about 300 nmi (350 mi; 560 km) north of Fletcher, near the maximum range for his carrier aircraft. He concluded, based on the sighting report, TF 17 was heading south and increasing the range. Furthermore, Fletcher's ships were under a large, low-hanging overcast which Takagi and Hara felt would make it difficult for their aircraft to find the American carriers. Takagi detached his two carriers with two destroyers under Hara's command to head towards TF 17 at 20 knots and to be in position to attack at first light.

American B-17 bombers based in Australia and staging through Port Moresby attacked the approaching invasion forces, including Gotō's warships, several times during the day on 6 May without success. MacArthur's headquarters radioed Fletcher with reports of the attacks and the locations of the Japanese invasion forces. MacArthur's fliers' reports of seeing a carrier (Shōhō) about 425 nmi (489 mi; 787 km) northwest of TF17 further convinced Fletcher fleet carriers were with the invasion force.

At 18:00, TF 17 completed fueling and Fletcher detached Neosho with a destroyer, Sims, to take station further south at a prearranged rendezvous. TF 17 then headed northwest towards Rossel Island in the Louisiades. Unbeknownst to the two admirals, their carriers were only 70 nm away from each other by 20:00 that night. At that time, Hara reversed course to meet Takagi who completed refueling and was now heading in Hara's direction.

Meanwhile on Corregidor, Brigadier General Wainwright surrendered the last remaining American army forces (about 12,000 men) to Japanese General Homma. 

The stage was set.

May 5, 1942: Battle Of The Coral Sea

At 08:16 on May 5, TF 17 (Yorktown) rendezvoused with TF 11 (Lexington) and TF 44 (cruisers and destroyers) 320 mi south of Guadalcanal. At about the same time, four F4F Wildcat fighter aircraft from Yorktown intercepted a large Japanese reconnaissance seaplane from the Shortland Islands and shot it down. The aircraft was unable to send a report, but when it failed to return to base the Japanese assumed that it was shot down by carrier aircraft.


Pearl Harbor notified VADM Fletcher that based on radio intelligence the Japanese planned to land troops at Port Moresby May 10 and their fleet carriers would likely be operating close to the invasion convoy. Armed with this information, Fletcher directed TF 17 to refuel from Neosho. On 6 May, he planned to take his forces north towards the Louisiades and do battle on 7 May.

In the meantime, Takagi's carrier force steamed down the east side of the Solomons throughout the day on 5 May, turned west to pass south of San Cristobal (Makira), and enter the Coral Sea. Takagi also expected to do battle on May 7.

More South Avenue Considerations

This will probably be my last post on this subject for awhile, unless something really alarming happens. 

I recommend the town board be very clear in their guidance to the town attorney.

If the central issue is, as I believe, whether the proposal by Mr. Chris Fulcher offers equivalent or improved public access to public trust waters in the town's harbor, we need to compare relevant facts. And our attorney needs to have command of all of the facts as he negotiates details.

Some issues:

Legal:

1. South Avenue was dedicated to public use of the citizens of Oriental by the principal landowner, Mr. Robert P. Midyette, in 1900 – providing public access to the water;
2. Avenue A was dedicated by Mr. Benjamin Wallace O'Neill in December, 1917 by the sale of lot 1 of the Oriental Bulkhead Improvement Company – Avenue A never led to the water;
3. The town may not sell a dedicated and accepted right of way either for money or any other valuable consideration. An exchange of ROW for title to property looks like a sale. I have said before and still believe, it would be better if Mr. Fulcher dedicates the property to the town for purposes of public access to the water than for the town to receive it in fee simple as a proprietor. It would be more clearly legal and provide better protection to the public.

Dimensions of South Avenue:

1. The South Avenue Right of Way is 60 feet wide;
2. Because of the angle at which South Avenue intersects the Raccoon Creek, the waterfront is approximately 90 feet long;
3. Because of the direction of the riparian boundaries, the width of the water to which the town owns rights is 85 feet, more or less, in a direction parallel to Mr. Fulcher's existing piers;
4. Mandatory (15 foot) CAMA buffers at the edges of the riparian area reduce the width of riparian area available for constructing piers or docks to 55 feet;
5. The parcel Mr. Fulcher proposes to donate to the town is 55 feet wide at the water's edge – he proposes both parties waive mandatory CAMA buffer: even so, with a mandatory CAMA buffer at the Toucan Grill end, that leaves only 40 buildable feet, even with the waiver.

What Can Be Built:

1. It is often asserted that we can build NOTHING on a right of way, “not even a gazebo!”
2. Not necessarily - we build stuff in rights of way all the time;
3. The rule is that we can build no permanent structure, even in unopened sections, that would prevent eventual use for ROW purposes;
4. In Town of Oriental ROWs, we plant trees, construct water mains and Sewer mains, utility poles and other encumbrances;
5. Yesterday a truck delivered a rest room facility and placed it in the ROW at Lou-Mac;
6. Other communities build shelters for bus riders, including public school students in their ROW (some shelters might even resemble gazebos);
7. Each year during Croaker Fest, large tents supported by pipe frames are installed on South Avenue near Lou-Mac Park, even involving some degree of damage to pavement;
8. During some large public events in the past, such as bicycle events, etc. organizers have placed trailers on the right of way for participants, including shower and rest room facilities.
9. In short, obstacles to providing public facilities for visitors and event participants in our ROW are not insurmountable. It might require a bit of imagination. [I am indebted to Kathy McIlheny, who gave me the trailer idea]
10. The proposed parcel is unbuildable for 50' from the water's edge Neuse River Buffer), the next 25' is in a CAMA area of environmental concern, and the last roughly 30 feet will probably be used for parking and other requirements to comply with our GMO, as well as ramps to meet ADA requirements for access to any building constructed on the property.

Advantages of The Proposed Parcel:

1. The site has been dredged and bulkheaded and a pier is under construction;
2. Sewer and water connections already exist;
   3.  Fewer building restrictions than a right of way.

Disadvantages of The Proposed Parcel:

1. Narrowness of the parcel and riparian area constrains visiting boats;
2. Some say the pier is unsuitable – too industrial for recreational boats;
3. Some say the projected pier is in the wrong place.

Conclusions:

The decision should be based on what is best for the town.

Avenue A only provides public access to Mr. Fulcher's property.

It is not correct to say that rights of way "are of no value." In coastal North Carolina, nothing is more valuable to the public than public access to the water.

Tulagi: Seventy Years Ago In The Coral Sea

May 4, 1942, US Carrier Task Force 17, under command of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, launched 60 aircraft from USS Yorktown to attack the Japanese invasion force already landing at Tulagi in the Solomons. Yorktown's aircraft surprised the Japanese, sank one destroyer and three minesweepers and heavily damaged a number of cargo ships.

At that point, the force was about a hundred miles south of Guadalcanal. Task Force 11, with aircraft carrier USS Lexington was about 60 miles East of TF 17.  The Japanese Carrier Strike Force with carriers Zuikaku and Shōkaku, two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers that sortied from Truk on 1 May was about 350 miles north of Tulagi under command of Vice Admiral Takagi. On learning of the US attack on Tulagi, Takagi moved his carrier strike force south into the Coral Sea.

The four-day-long Battle of The Coral Sea had begun. The fate of New Guinea and Australia was in the hands of two US Carrier Task Forces.

It had been five months since Pearl Harbor.