Saturday, August 11, 2012
London Rubble, 1955
The first time I saw London, in 1955, it hadn't been rebuilt. The rubble, though, had been arranged in ordered piles, set off by walls of damaged brick. I shot this from a double decker bus.
Lost In The Village?
As the rain began to fall this morning, I ran into a frequent visitor to Oriental with a puzzled look on his face. "I can't find my truck," he admitted. I was on my bike, so I didn't offer him a ride. A kind neighbor rode by and offered to take him on a search. I'm confident he found it.
Getting lost in Oriental? Who knew it could be done?
Getting lost in Oriental? Who knew it could be done?
Friday, August 10, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Higgins Boats And Beachmasters
The initial landing of marines on Guadalcanal was a fiasco. After three days of unloading, less than half of the planned equipment and supplies had reached the landing beaches, and much of that didn't reach the supply dumps for days.
What was the problem?
Lack of equipment and inadequate organization.
The most apparent equipment shortcoming was the wrong boats for the task.
The Amphibious Transports (APA) carried many boats, but most were the first generation of Higgins boats, the Landing Craft, Personnel (Large) or LCPL. When the boats grounded on the beach, marines had to clamber over the side into the water and then wade in to shore. Not too bad for the marines, but what about the equipment? Much of it had to be manhandled over the side of the boats as well.
The marines and the US Navy Bureau of Ships recognized early on that this was a problem. Tests were done in the late 30's of a modified landing craft with a bow ramp, the LCP(R). The photo below shows that this was an improvement, but the ramp proved to be something of a bottleneck for troops anxious to hit the beach. There were some LCP(R)'s at Guadalcanal, but not nearly enough.
Some LCP(R)'s remained in service after the war. Here is a photo of an LCP(R) carried on the helicopter platform of USS Cabildo (LSD-16) at Yokosuka, Japan in 1959. The fierce decoration on the bow indicates it belonged to an underwater demolition team (UDT). UDT later morphed into the SEALS.
The final design improvement was to fit a full-width bow ramp. This allowed the landing craft, now designated the Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel or LCVP, to deliver 36 combat-equipped troops to the beach, or one jeep and a crew of half a dozen.
This became the work horse of ship to shore movements. But they weren't available at Guadalcanal.
Here is a fully-loaded LCVP on its way to the beach in 1959:
The other missing ingredient was organization for efficient management of the troops, equipment and supplies delivered to the beach.
The Guadalcanal landing was rehearsed at Fiji before the invasion, but for some reason the problem of moving stuff off the beach either wasn't identified or wasn't resolved. It is also possible the ships hadn't been "combat loaded." This was a technique to load equipment in reverse order of its planned need, rather than to make most efficient use of cargo space.
Later in the war, combat loading became routine, and a special organization called a Beachmaster was established to manage the cargo and equipment.
These techniques were yet to come.
What was the problem?
Lack of equipment and inadequate organization.
The most apparent equipment shortcoming was the wrong boats for the task.
The Amphibious Transports (APA) carried many boats, but most were the first generation of Higgins boats, the Landing Craft, Personnel (Large) or LCPL. When the boats grounded on the beach, marines had to clamber over the side into the water and then wade in to shore. Not too bad for the marines, but what about the equipment? Much of it had to be manhandled over the side of the boats as well.
The marines and the US Navy Bureau of Ships recognized early on that this was a problem. Tests were done in the late 30's of a modified landing craft with a bow ramp, the LCP(R). The photo below shows that this was an improvement, but the ramp proved to be something of a bottleneck for troops anxious to hit the beach. There were some LCP(R)'s at Guadalcanal, but not nearly enough.
Some LCP(R)'s remained in service after the war. Here is a photo of an LCP(R) carried on the helicopter platform of USS Cabildo (LSD-16) at Yokosuka, Japan in 1959. The fierce decoration on the bow indicates it belonged to an underwater demolition team (UDT). UDT later morphed into the SEALS.
The final design improvement was to fit a full-width bow ramp. This allowed the landing craft, now designated the Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel or LCVP, to deliver 36 combat-equipped troops to the beach, or one jeep and a crew of half a dozen.
This became the work horse of ship to shore movements. But they weren't available at Guadalcanal.
Here is a fully-loaded LCVP on its way to the beach in 1959:
The other missing ingredient was organization for efficient management of the troops, equipment and supplies delivered to the beach.
The Guadalcanal landing was rehearsed at Fiji before the invasion, but for some reason the problem of moving stuff off the beach either wasn't identified or wasn't resolved. It is also possible the ships hadn't been "combat loaded." This was a technique to load equipment in reverse order of its planned need, rather than to make most efficient use of cargo space.
Later in the war, combat loading became routine, and a special organization called a Beachmaster was established to manage the cargo and equipment.
These techniques were yet to come.
Thursday, August 9, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Battle Of Savo Island
The Japanese were caught completely by surprise when the US invasion force showed up at Guadalcanal snd put marines ashore the morning of August 7, 1942. Their first reaction was to launch air attacks, but the distance from shore bases to Guadalcanal rendered the attacks ineffective. Admiral Fletcher's force of three aircraft carriers, supported by five fleet oilers, the battleship North Carolina and a number of smaller escorts, provided a substantial advantage. For the first two days of the invasion, the Japanese lost twice as many aircraft as the Americans.
Japanese Admiral Mikawa, 8th Fleet Commander, quickly organized a counterattack. He departed Kavieng at the NW end of New Ireland the afternoon of August 7th with heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka, Kako and Kinugasa, joined near sunset by heavy cruiser Chokai, light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari and destroyer Yanagi. Concerned by the presence of American aircraft carriers, Mikawa paused off Bouganville from dawn until noon, August 8 ("B") and then proceeded down The Slot towards Savo Island and Guadalcanal, sighting the U.S. destroyer Blue at 00:54 on August 9 ("C"). Source: Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 21.
An allied screening force of six heavy cruisers and six destroyers in two groups covering both western approaches to Savo Sound. Radar picket destroyers Blue (DD-387) and Ralph Talbot (DD-390) deployed west of Savo Island. The south passage was defended by HMAS Australia (flagship of RAdm Crutchley, RN), HMAS Canberra, USS Chicago (CA-29), Bagley (DD-386) and Patterson (DD-392). The northern group was made up of Vincennes (CA-44), Quincy (CA-39), Astoria (CA-34) and destroyers Helm (DD-391) and Wilson (DD-408). The eastern approaches also had a screening force, made up of light cruisers San Juan (CL-54 flag), HMAS Hobart, and destroyers Monssen (DD-436) and Buchanan (DD-484).
The IJN 8th fleet of fast cruisers were spotted during their passage by US Submarine S-38, as well as by at least one Australian Hudson patrol aircraft. They arrived the second night and met the US screening force for the Battle of Savo Island. At the same time, the three US carriers and their escorts, including North Carolina (BB-55), six cruisers, and 16 destroyers, were withdrawing to get out of reach of land-based bombers from Rabaul.
The enemy cruiser force launched scout floatplanes that reported the American forces. Both radar picket ships (radar range about 10 miles) were at the extreme ends of their patrols sailing away from the Japanese fleet which passed undetected about 500 yards from Blue. The enemy was screened by the visual and radar shadow of nearby Savo Island. The enemy discovered the southern force and fired torpedoes before they were detected. Simultaneously with the explosions, the scout plane dropped flares illuminating the allied fleet. Canberra was struck by two torpedoes and heavy shelling. The US ships fired star shells and opened fire. Chicago of the southern force was torpedoed.
The allied force thought the torpedoes were fired by submarines, as they saw no surface ships within torpedo firing range. Even this late in the war, American forces were unaware of the Japanese type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo, which had three times the range of similar sized US torpedoes and a heavier warhead. A second advantage of the Japanese force is that, though they had no sipboard radar at the time, they had superb optical systems and IJN ships had been well trained for night operations.
The Japanese force turned north in two columns. The northern defense force had not gotten the word, there was a rain squall in the area, and they assumed the southern force was shooting at aircraft. The two Japanese columns passed on each side of the US force and opened fire on Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes. The American captains ordered "cease fire" assuming they were Americans firing on their own ships. Vincennes caught a torpedo. Robert Talbot came charging south and was attacked first by friendly fire and then raked by the enemy escaping to the north. Quincy and Vincennes went down. During rescue operations for Canberra, Patterson was fired on by Chicago. Canberra was sunk the next morning to prevent capture as the US fleet left the waters that was hereafter called Iron Bottom Sound. Astoria sank about noon while under tow. Chicago had to undergo repair until Jan'43.
In just 32 minutes the Japanese navy had inflicted massive damage on the allied force. Four heavy cruisers were sunk and a heavy cruiser and destroyer badly damaged. 1,270 men were killed and 708 injured. The enemy suffered light damage to three cruisers.
The Japanese force, worried about carrier air attack, withdrew before dawn without attacking the cargo ships remaining at Guadalcanal.
As far as the US Navy went, involvement in the disaster at Savo Island and other shortcomings of the Guadalcanal operation was not in general a "career-enhancing" experience. Admirals Ghormley and Fletcher were transferred to other, less-demanding assignments not long afterward. Ghormley was replaced by Halsey, and things picked up greatly in the Guadalcanal campaign.
Only Richmond Kelly Turner, of the senior officers, survived seemingly unscathed. He later offered a self-serving explanation of the ignominious defeat of the surface forces under his command:
"The (U.S.) Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise."
It was Richmond Kelly Turner who was most immediately responsible for insuring the readiness of the invasion force.
Japanese Admiral Mikawa, 8th Fleet Commander, quickly organized a counterattack. He departed Kavieng at the NW end of New Ireland the afternoon of August 7th with heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka, Kako and Kinugasa, joined near sunset by heavy cruiser Chokai, light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari and destroyer Yanagi. Concerned by the presence of American aircraft carriers, Mikawa paused off Bouganville from dawn until noon, August 8 ("B") and then proceeded down The Slot towards Savo Island and Guadalcanal, sighting the U.S. destroyer Blue at 00:54 on August 9 ("C"). Source: Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 21.
An allied screening force of six heavy cruisers and six destroyers in two groups covering both western approaches to Savo Sound. Radar picket destroyers Blue (DD-387) and Ralph Talbot (DD-390) deployed west of Savo Island. The south passage was defended by HMAS Australia (flagship of RAdm Crutchley, RN), HMAS Canberra, USS Chicago (CA-29), Bagley (DD-386) and Patterson (DD-392). The northern group was made up of Vincennes (CA-44), Quincy (CA-39), Astoria (CA-34) and destroyers Helm (DD-391) and Wilson (DD-408). The eastern approaches also had a screening force, made up of light cruisers San Juan (CL-54 flag), HMAS Hobart, and destroyers Monssen (DD-436) and Buchanan (DD-484).
The IJN 8th fleet of fast cruisers were spotted during their passage by US Submarine S-38, as well as by at least one Australian Hudson patrol aircraft. They arrived the second night and met the US screening force for the Battle of Savo Island. At the same time, the three US carriers and their escorts, including North Carolina (BB-55), six cruisers, and 16 destroyers, were withdrawing to get out of reach of land-based bombers from Rabaul.
The enemy cruiser force launched scout floatplanes that reported the American forces. Both radar picket ships (radar range about 10 miles) were at the extreme ends of their patrols sailing away from the Japanese fleet which passed undetected about 500 yards from Blue. The enemy was screened by the visual and radar shadow of nearby Savo Island. The enemy discovered the southern force and fired torpedoes before they were detected. Simultaneously with the explosions, the scout plane dropped flares illuminating the allied fleet. Canberra was struck by two torpedoes and heavy shelling. The US ships fired star shells and opened fire. Chicago of the southern force was torpedoed.
The allied force thought the torpedoes were fired by submarines, as they saw no surface ships within torpedo firing range. Even this late in the war, American forces were unaware of the Japanese type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo, which had three times the range of similar sized US torpedoes and a heavier warhead. A second advantage of the Japanese force is that, though they had no sipboard radar at the time, they had superb optical systems and IJN ships had been well trained for night operations.
The Japanese force turned north in two columns. The northern defense force had not gotten the word, there was a rain squall in the area, and they assumed the southern force was shooting at aircraft. The two Japanese columns passed on each side of the US force and opened fire on Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes. The American captains ordered "cease fire" assuming they were Americans firing on their own ships. Vincennes caught a torpedo. Robert Talbot came charging south and was attacked first by friendly fire and then raked by the enemy escaping to the north. Quincy and Vincennes went down. During rescue operations for Canberra, Patterson was fired on by Chicago. Canberra was sunk the next morning to prevent capture as the US fleet left the waters that was hereafter called Iron Bottom Sound. Astoria sank about noon while under tow. Chicago had to undergo repair until Jan'43.
In just 32 minutes the Japanese navy had inflicted massive damage on the allied force. Four heavy cruisers were sunk and a heavy cruiser and destroyer badly damaged. 1,270 men were killed and 708 injured. The enemy suffered light damage to three cruisers.
The Japanese force, worried about carrier air attack, withdrew before dawn without attacking the cargo ships remaining at Guadalcanal.
As far as the US Navy went, involvement in the disaster at Savo Island and other shortcomings of the Guadalcanal operation was not in general a "career-enhancing" experience. Admirals Ghormley and Fletcher were transferred to other, less-demanding assignments not long afterward. Ghormley was replaced by Halsey, and things picked up greatly in the Guadalcanal campaign.
Only Richmond Kelly Turner, of the senior officers, survived seemingly unscathed. He later offered a self-serving explanation of the ignominious defeat of the surface forces under his command:
"The (U.S.) Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise."
It was Richmond Kelly Turner who was most immediately responsible for insuring the readiness of the invasion force.
Wednesday, August 8, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Guadalcanal, Day 2
The 11,000 marines landing on Guadalcanal encountered no initial Japanese opposition. The marine force was made up mostly of recruits fresh from military training, equipped with old bolt-action (1903 Springfield) rifles.
Because of the desire to get the force into action quickly, logistics planners loaded the ships with only 60 days worth of supplies instead of 90 days. Marines began referring to the invasion as "Operation Shoestring." Even worse, unloading supplies on the beach and transporting them to supply dumps was taking longer than expected.
Marines fighting on Tulagi and two other small islands, unlike Guadalcanal itself, encountered fierce Japanese defenses. Japanese aircraft from Rabaul attacked the landing force during the first two days of the invasion. Japan lost 36 aircraft. Admiral Fletcher's force lost 19, including fourteen fighters.
In a still controversial move, on August 8th Admiral Fletcher, possibly thinking things were going smoothly on the beaches, withdrew the three carriers providing air support for the invasion, leaving Admiral Turner helpless against any further Japanese air attacks.
The air strip under construction by Japan, which the marines renamed Henderson Field, would not be able to operate aircraft for almost two weeks.
In the meantime, Admiral Turner tried to unload his transport ships before leaving the area, but by the morning of August 9, had unloaded less than half of the supplies the ships carried. Five days worth of food had been landed from the transports, which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days worth of food. To conserve supplies, the troops were limited to two meals per day.
Marines referred to the departure of Fletcher and Turner as the "great Navy Bug-out."
That night things got worse.
Because of the desire to get the force into action quickly, logistics planners loaded the ships with only 60 days worth of supplies instead of 90 days. Marines began referring to the invasion as "Operation Shoestring." Even worse, unloading supplies on the beach and transporting them to supply dumps was taking longer than expected.
Marines fighting on Tulagi and two other small islands, unlike Guadalcanal itself, encountered fierce Japanese defenses. Japanese aircraft from Rabaul attacked the landing force during the first two days of the invasion. Japan lost 36 aircraft. Admiral Fletcher's force lost 19, including fourteen fighters.
In a still controversial move, on August 8th Admiral Fletcher, possibly thinking things were going smoothly on the beaches, withdrew the three carriers providing air support for the invasion, leaving Admiral Turner helpless against any further Japanese air attacks.
The air strip under construction by Japan, which the marines renamed Henderson Field, would not be able to operate aircraft for almost two weeks.
In the meantime, Admiral Turner tried to unload his transport ships before leaving the area, but by the morning of August 9, had unloaded less than half of the supplies the ships carried. Five days worth of food had been landed from the transports, which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days worth of food. To conserve supplies, the troops were limited to two meals per day.
Marines referred to the departure of Fletcher and Turner as the "great Navy Bug-out."
That night things got worse.
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
Cox v. Town Of Oriental
Some readers are aware that I filed an appeal last Thursday to the closing by the Town of Oriental of Avenue A on July 3 after a public hearing.
I filed the appeal within the statutory deadline of thirty days following the permanent closing of the street. A civil summons notifying the town of the appeal and providing a copy was served on Mayor Sage Monday morning about ten o'clock.
The mayor transmitted the appeal to Mr. Scott Davis, the Town Attorney, and to the town's insurance carrier.
Anyone who wishes to read a copy of the appeal will find a link on the home page of TownDock.net. I think the appeal speaks for itself.
I filed the appeal within the statutory deadline of thirty days following the permanent closing of the street. A civil summons notifying the town of the appeal and providing a copy was served on Mayor Sage Monday morning about ten o'clock.
The mayor transmitted the appeal to Mr. Scott Davis, the Town Attorney, and to the town's insurance carrier.
Anyone who wishes to read a copy of the appeal will find a link on the home page of TownDock.net. I think the appeal speaks for itself.
Seventy Years Ago: Guadalcanal
The morning of August 7, 1942, an invasion force of 48 ships under Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner rounded Cape Esperance and Savo Island in the southern Solomons and bombarded Japanese targets on Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Florida Islands. Bad weather had concealed the force from the Japanese, who were caught completely by surprise.
A supporting force of three US Carriers (Saratoga, Enterprise and Wasp) and the battleship North Carolina, under command of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, stood offshore and attacked Japanese objectives with carrier aircraft. After the bombardment, 14,000 marines under Major General Vandegrift went ashore on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the largest US amphibious operation undertaken up to that time. The principal objective: an air base under construction by the Japanese at Lunga Point on the north shore of Guadalcanal.
The US land offensive had begun.
A supporting force of three US Carriers (Saratoga, Enterprise and Wasp) and the battleship North Carolina, under command of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, stood offshore and attacked Japanese objectives with carrier aircraft. After the bombardment, 14,000 marines under Major General Vandegrift went ashore on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the largest US amphibious operation undertaken up to that time. The principal objective: an air base under construction by the Japanese at Lunga Point on the north shore of Guadalcanal.
The US land offensive had begun.
Monday, August 6, 2012
To Arms!
Yesterday's shooting at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin, like the killings in Aurora, Colorado over a week ago, inevitably raise questions of the Second Amendment. The discussion these days invariably misrepresents the Second Amendment, takes it out of its historical context and leads the discussion into paths that need not be followed.
The Second Amendment was really the anti-Redcoat provision. Written less than fifteen years after the "shot heard round the world," the object really was to insure the United States would not have a large standing army. The revolutionists believed standing armies were destructive of freedom. The unstated, but clear presumption, was that militias under state control could defend against a small standing federal force, should it be necessary.
Justice Antonin Scalia proudly claims to be an "originalist," meaning judicial decisions should be informed by the original meaning of words in a law or constitution.
Two Sundays ago on Fox News Sunday, Justice Scalia revealed his ignorance of historic terms of art in the profession of arms and his superficial grasp of original meaning. The interviewer, Chris Wallace, asked Justice Scalia about the Second Amendment in light of the mass killings in Aurora, Colorado. Could there be any limits on the right to bear arms? Wallace asked. Scalia answered that, if a weapon can be hand-held, it probably still falls under the right to “bear arms”:
Obviously Antonin Scalia has never borne arms. To bear arms is a term of art, ancient in origin, which means "to serve in the armed forces." Military personnel keep and bear arms. The term is not limited to arms a person can carry. Legally, under the International Traffic In Arms (ITAR) regulations, the term can apply to items not normally thought of as arms, like encryption programs. To "keep arms" does not mean to have in one's possession. It means to maintain in good order, as for example a lighthouse keeper does for a lighthouse.
These are things the average person understood in 1789.
Some definitions:
"arms [ɑːmz]pl n
up in arms indignant; prepared to protest strongly"
Civilians do not bear arms - soldiers and sailors do.
To bear arms includes to equip one's force with or operate any kind of weapon, including: sword, spear, pike, rifle, pistol, howitzer, bomb, torpedo, airplane, tank, warship, even military trucks, jeeps, or other logistical equipment for military uses.
On a linguistic note, I wonder if Scalia's native tongue is English. In English (and Judges are expected to be very careful with language), there is a vast difference between "people" and "the people." "People" can refer to a collection of individuals - "people like football," for example. "The people" is always a collective noun and never refers to individuals. The drafters of our constitution invariably used the word "persons" when they referred to an individual right, though "people" might have also served the purpose. So when the drafters of the Second Amendment wrote "the right of the people to keep and bear arms," as a matter of language, they were not referring to an individual right.
Scalia's insistence that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms is deficient as a matter of English grammar, reflects an inaccurate understanding of original meaning, and presents him with a logical dilemma, because he apparently recognizes that there must be some limits.
But he is wrong about cannon (and also ships, planes, rockets, bombs, torpedoes, missiles, etc.). They are all arms, and the people who maintain and operate them are engaged in keeping and bearing arms.
Which neither Antonin Scalia nor any other sitting Justice has ever done.
The Second Amendment was really the anti-Redcoat provision. Written less than fifteen years after the "shot heard round the world," the object really was to insure the United States would not have a large standing army. The revolutionists believed standing armies were destructive of freedom. The unstated, but clear presumption, was that militias under state control could defend against a small standing federal force, should it be necessary.
Justice Antonin Scalia proudly claims to be an "originalist," meaning judicial decisions should be informed by the original meaning of words in a law or constitution.
Two Sundays ago on Fox News Sunday, Justice Scalia revealed his ignorance of historic terms of art in the profession of arms and his superficial grasp of original meaning. The interviewer, Chris Wallace, asked Justice Scalia about the Second Amendment in light of the mass killings in Aurora, Colorado. Could there be any limits on the right to bear arms? Wallace asked. Scalia answered that, if a weapon can be hand-held, it probably still falls under the right to “bear arms”:
WALLACE: What about… a weapon that can fire a hundred shots in a minute?Obviously?
SCALIA: We’ll see. Obviously the Amendment does not apply to arms that cannot be hand-carried — it’s to keep and “bear,” so it doesn’t apply to cannons — but I suppose here are hand-held rocket launchers that can bring down airplanes, that will have to be decided.
WALLACE: How do you decide that if you’re a textualist?
SCALIA: Very carefully.
Obviously Antonin Scalia has never borne arms. To bear arms is a term of art, ancient in origin, which means "to serve in the armed forces." Military personnel keep and bear arms. The term is not limited to arms a person can carry. Legally, under the International Traffic In Arms (ITAR) regulations, the term can apply to items not normally thought of as arms, like encryption programs. To "keep arms" does not mean to have in one's possession. It means to maintain in good order, as for example a lighthouse keeper does for a lighthouse.
These are things the average person understood in 1789.
Some definitions:
"arms [ɑːmz]pl n
1. (Military / Firearms, Gunnery, Ordnance & Artillery) weapons collectively See also small arms
2. (Military) military exploits prowess in arms
3.
(History / Heraldry) the official heraldic symbols of a family, state,
etc., including a shield with distinctive devices, and often supports, a
crest, or other insignia
bear arms
a. (Military) to carry weapons
b. (Military) to serve in the armed forces
c. (History / Heraldry) to have a coat of arms
(Military)
in or under arms armed and prepared for war
(Military)
lay down one's arms to stop fighting; surrender
(Military)
present arms Military
a.
a position of salute in which the rifle is brought up to a position
vertically in line with the body, muzzle uppermost and trigger guard to
the fore
b. the command for this drill
(Military)
take (up) arms to prepare to fight
to arms! arm yourselves!
Civilians do not bear arms - soldiers and sailors do.
To bear arms includes to equip one's force with or operate any kind of weapon, including: sword, spear, pike, rifle, pistol, howitzer, bomb, torpedo, airplane, tank, warship, even military trucks, jeeps, or other logistical equipment for military uses.
On a linguistic note, I wonder if Scalia's native tongue is English. In English (and Judges are expected to be very careful with language), there is a vast difference between "people" and "the people." "People" can refer to a collection of individuals - "people like football," for example. "The people" is always a collective noun and never refers to individuals. The drafters of our constitution invariably used the word "persons" when they referred to an individual right, though "people" might have also served the purpose. So when the drafters of the Second Amendment wrote "the right of the people to keep and bear arms," as a matter of language, they were not referring to an individual right.
Scalia's insistence that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms is deficient as a matter of English grammar, reflects an inaccurate understanding of original meaning, and presents him with a logical dilemma, because he apparently recognizes that there must be some limits.
But he is wrong about cannon (and also ships, planes, rockets, bombs, torpedoes, missiles, etc.). They are all arms, and the people who maintain and operate them are engaged in keeping and bearing arms.
Which neither Antonin Scalia nor any other sitting Justice has ever done.
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