Seventy Years Ago: Wasted History?

Someone once observed that history is wasted on the young.

I was seventeen years old when I first learned something of the history of the Navy's fiasco at Savo Island. I was a Midshipman Fourth Class, United States Naval Reserve, taking my first course in Naval Science. It was called Naval Orientation and History.

The textbook showed neat diagrams of the action of August 9, 1942, like the chart below:



The lessons I took away from reading about Savo Island nearly six decades ago had to do with equipment and training. US Ships (some of them, at least) were equipped with radar, but they were defeated by Japanese ships with no radar - only superb optical systems and sailors well trained in night engagements.

Of course it wouldn't occur to a seventeen year old that the problem wasn't poor watch standing by  radar operators or lookouts, but problems at the highest levels of leadership in the navy.

President Roosevelt was furious and losing patience ten weeks after Pearl Harbor, when the navy had no triumphs to proclaim. He ordered Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to give him the names of the forty "most competent" Admirals in the navy at the time. Knox appointed a board to do the job.  Last year the US Naval Institutes' Naval History magazine published the recently-discovered list of the forty names the board provided.

Even more surprising than the obscure names who appeared on the list was the omission of two admirals most responsible for success in the Pacific: Chester Nimitz and Raymond Spruance. Neither was a member of the most influential and powerful cabal in the navy. That cabal is often referred to by the shorthand designator: "battleship admirals." That's a misnomer, though battleships figured largely in their careers. They were admirals whose seagoing tours (mostly in battleships but also in cruisers and destroyers) alternated with tours in the Bureau of Ordinance (BUORD). They were often referred to in the rest of the navy as "the gun club."

Neither Nimitz nor Spruance belonged to the gun club. Neither was Halsey, for that matter. Nor were Admiral Leahy, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II and Roosevelt's closest military advisor, or Admiral King, Commander in Chief of the US Fleet. But from the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) on down, the navy in 1942 remained dominated by the gun club.

None of the "gun club" admirals was promoted to five-star fleet admiral rank.

More later.

London Rubble, 1955

The first time I saw London, in 1955, it hadn't been rebuilt. The rubble, though, had been arranged in ordered piles, set off by walls of damaged brick. I shot this from a double decker bus.

Lost In The Village?

As the rain began to fall this morning, I ran into a frequent visitor to Oriental with a puzzled look on his face. "I can't find my truck," he admitted. I was on my bike, so I didn't offer him a ride. A kind neighbor rode by and offered to take him on a search. I'm confident he found it.

Getting lost in Oriental? Who knew it could be done?

Seventy Years Ago: Higgins Boats And Beachmasters

The initial landing of marines on Guadalcanal was a fiasco. After three days of unloading, less than half of the planned equipment and supplies had reached the landing beaches, and much of that didn't reach the supply dumps for days.

What was the problem?

Lack of equipment and inadequate organization.

The most apparent equipment shortcoming was the wrong boats for the task.



The Amphibious Transports (APA) carried many boats, but most were the first generation of Higgins boats, the Landing Craft, Personnel (Large) or LCPL. When the boats grounded on the beach, marines had to clamber over the side into the water and then wade in to shore. Not too bad for the marines, but what about the equipment? Much of it had to be manhandled over the side of the boats as well.

The marines and the US Navy Bureau of Ships recognized early on that this was a problem. Tests were done in the late 30's of a modified landing craft with a bow ramp, the LCP(R). The photo below shows that this was an improvement, but the ramp proved to be something of a bottleneck for troops anxious to hit the beach. There were some LCP(R)'s at Guadalcanal, but not nearly enough.



Some LCP(R)'s remained in service after the war. Here is a photo of an LCP(R) carried on the helicopter platform of USS Cabildo (LSD-16) at Yokosuka, Japan in 1959. The fierce decoration on the bow indicates it belonged to an underwater demolition team (UDT). UDT later morphed into the SEALS.

The final design improvement was to fit a full-width bow ramp. This allowed the landing craft, now designated the Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel or LCVP, to deliver 36 combat-equipped troops to the beach, or one jeep and a crew of half a dozen.







 This became the work horse of ship to shore movements. But they weren't available at Guadalcanal.

Here is a fully-loaded LCVP on its way to the beach in 1959:

The other missing ingredient was organization for efficient management of the troops, equipment and supplies delivered to the beach.

The Guadalcanal landing was rehearsed at Fiji before the invasion, but for some reason the problem of moving stuff off the beach either wasn't identified or wasn't resolved. It is also possible the ships hadn't been "combat loaded." This was a technique to load equipment in reverse order of its planned need, rather than to make most efficient use of cargo space.

Later in the war, combat loading became routine, and a special organization called a Beachmaster was established to manage the cargo and equipment.

These techniques were yet to come.

Seventy Years Ago: Battle Of Savo Island

The Japanese were caught completely by surprise when the US invasion force showed up at Guadalcanal snd put marines ashore the morning of August 7, 1942. Their first reaction was to launch air attacks, but the distance from shore bases to Guadalcanal rendered the attacks ineffective. Admiral Fletcher's force of three aircraft carriers, supported by five fleet oilers, the battleship North Carolina and a number of smaller escorts, provided a substantial advantage. For the first two days of the invasion, the Japanese lost twice as many aircraft as the Americans.



Japanese Admiral Mikawa, 8th Fleet Commander, quickly organized a counterattack. He departed Kavieng at the NW end of New Ireland the afternoon of August 7th with heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka, Kako and Kinugasa, joined near sunset by heavy cruiser Chokai, light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari and destroyer Yanagi. Concerned by the presence of American aircraft carriers, Mikawa paused off Bouganville from dawn until noon, August 8 ("B") and then proceeded down The Slot towards Savo Island and Guadalcanal, sighting the U.S. destroyer Blue at 00:54 on August 9 ("C"). Source: Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 21.


An allied screening force of six heavy cruisers and six destroyers in two groups covering both western approaches to Savo Sound.  Radar picket destroyers Blue (DD-387) and Ralph Talbot (DD-390) deployed west of Savo Island. The south passage was defended by HMAS Australia (flagship of RAdm Crutchley, RN), HMAS Canberra, USS Chicago (CA-29), Bagley (DD-386) and Patterson (DD-392). The northern group was made up of Vincennes (CA-44), Quincy (CA-39), Astoria (CA-34) and destroyers Helm (DD-391) and Wilson (DD-408).  The eastern approaches also had a screening force, made up of light cruisers San Juan (CL-54  flag), HMAS Hobart, and destroyers Monssen (DD-436) and Buchanan (DD-484).


The IJN 8th fleet of fast cruisers were spotted during their passage by US Submarine S-38, as well as by at least one Australian Hudson patrol aircraft. They arrived the second night and met the US screening force for the Battle of Savo Island.   At the same time, the three US carriers and their escorts, including North Carolina (BB-55), six cruisers, and 16 destroyers, were withdrawing to get out of reach of land-based bombers from Rabaul.

The enemy cruiser force launched scout floatplanes that reported the American forces.  Both radar picket ships (radar range about 10 miles) were at the extreme ends of their patrols sailing away from the Japanese fleet which passed undetected about 500 yards from Blue.  The enemy was screened by the visual and radar shadow of nearby Savo Island.  The enemy discovered the southern force and fired torpedoes before they were detected. Simultaneously with the explosions, the scout plane dropped flares illuminating the allied fleet.  Canberra was struck by two torpedoes and heavy shelling.  The US ships fired star shells and opened fire.  Chicago of the southern force was torpedoed.

The allied force thought the torpedoes were fired by submarines, as they saw no surface ships within torpedo firing range. Even this late in the war, American forces were unaware of the Japanese type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo, which had three times the range of similar sized US torpedoes and a heavier warhead. A second advantage of the Japanese force is that, though they had no sipboard radar at the time, they had superb optical systems and IJN ships had been well trained for night operations. 

The Japanese force turned north in two columns.  The northern defense force had not gotten the word, there was a rain squall in the area, and they assumed the southern force was shooting at aircraft.  The two Japanese columns passed on each side of the US force and opened fire on Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes.  The American captains ordered "cease fire" assuming they were Americans firing on their own ships.  Vincennes caught a torpedo.  Robert Talbot came charging south and was attacked first by friendly fire and then raked by the enemy escaping to the north.  Quincy and Vincennes went down.  During rescue operations for Canberra, Patterson was fired on by Chicago.  Canberra was sunk the next morning to prevent capture as the US fleet left the waters that was hereafter called Iron Bottom Sound.  Astoria sank about noon while under tow.  Chicago had to undergo repair until Jan'43.

In just 32 minutes the Japanese navy had inflicted massive damage on the allied force.   Four heavy cruisers were sunk and a heavy cruiser and destroyer badly damaged.  1,270 men were killed and 708 injured.   The enemy suffered light damage to three cruisers.

The Japanese force, worried about carrier air attack, withdrew before dawn without attacking the cargo ships remaining at Guadalcanal. 

As far as the US Navy went, involvement in the disaster at Savo Island and other shortcomings of the Guadalcanal operation was not in general a "career-enhancing" experience. Admirals Ghormley and Fletcher were transferred to other, less-demanding assignments not long afterward. Ghormley was replaced by Halsey, and things picked up greatly in the Guadalcanal campaign.

Only Richmond Kelly Turner, of the senior officers, survived seemingly unscathed. He later offered a self-serving explanation of the ignominious defeat of the surface forces under his command:

"The (U.S.) Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances. The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor, as a cause of our defeat, was even more important than the element of surprise."

It was Richmond Kelly Turner who was most immediately responsible for insuring the readiness of the invasion force.

Seventy Years Ago: Guadalcanal, Day 2

The 11,000 marines landing on Guadalcanal encountered no initial Japanese opposition. The marine force was made up mostly of recruits fresh from military training, equipped with old bolt-action (1903 Springfield) rifles.

Because of the desire to get the force into action quickly, logistics planners loaded the ships with only 60 days worth of supplies instead of 90 days. Marines began referring to the invasion as "Operation Shoestring." Even worse, unloading supplies on the beach and transporting them to supply dumps was taking longer than expected.

Marines fighting on Tulagi and two other small islands, unlike Guadalcanal itself, encountered fierce Japanese defenses. Japanese aircraft from Rabaul attacked the landing force during the first two days of the invasion. Japan lost 36 aircraft. Admiral Fletcher's force lost 19, including fourteen fighters.

In a still controversial move, on August 8th Admiral Fletcher, possibly thinking things were going smoothly on the beaches, withdrew the three carriers providing air support for the invasion, leaving Admiral Turner helpless against any further Japanese air attacks.

The air strip under construction by Japan, which the marines renamed Henderson Field, would not be able to operate aircraft for almost two weeks.

In the meantime, Admiral Turner tried to unload his transport ships before leaving the area, but by the morning of August 9, had unloaded less than half of the supplies the ships carried. Five days worth of food had been landed from the transports, which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days worth of food. To conserve supplies, the troops were limited to two meals per day.

Marines referred to the departure of Fletcher and Turner as the "great Navy Bug-out."

That night things got worse.

Cox v. Town Of Oriental

Some readers are aware that I filed an appeal last Thursday to the closing by the Town of Oriental of Avenue A on July 3 after a public hearing.

I filed the appeal within the statutory deadline of thirty days following the permanent closing of the street. A civil summons notifying the town of the appeal and providing a copy was served on Mayor Sage Monday morning about ten o'clock.

The mayor transmitted the appeal to Mr. Scott Davis, the Town Attorney, and to the town's insurance carrier.

Anyone who wishes to read a copy of the appeal will find a link on the home page of TownDock.net. I think the appeal speaks for itself.

Seventy Years Ago: Guadalcanal

The morning of August 7, 1942, an invasion force of 48 ships under Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner rounded Cape Esperance and Savo Island in the southern Solomons and bombarded Japanese targets on Guadalcanal, Tulagi and Florida Islands. Bad weather had concealed the force from the Japanese, who were caught completely by surprise.

A supporting force of three US Carriers (Saratoga, Enterprise and Wasp) and the battleship North Carolina, under command of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, stood offshore and attacked Japanese objectives with carrier aircraft. After the bombardment, 14,000 marines under Major General Vandegrift went ashore on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the largest US amphibious operation undertaken up to that time. The principal objective: an air base under construction by the Japanese at Lunga Point on the north shore of Guadalcanal.

The US land offensive had begun.