Naval Communications

A century ago, the US Navy was just beginning to use radio communications. Otherwise, ships could communicate with each other only within line of sight.

But signalling by Morse code was slow. Radio propagation might be intermittent due to weather, sun spots, Northern Lights, ionosphere changes and other poorly-understood phenomena.

A result of the slow speed and unreliability of high frequency (also known to civilians as short wave) naval communications was to impose controls over message length. Officers drafted naval messages as though they were paying for the transmissions out of their own pocket. Not just by the word, but by the letter.

Administrative communications were usually sent by mail, even though delays were frequent. If the matter was urgent, it might go by radio, but using a terse, telegraphic style. The task was not unlike that facing users of twitter.

Officers would often receive message orders to transfer from one duty station to another. A transfer message might say something like: "RELDET PROPORICH USS NEVERSAIL(BB-99) ARREPCODU."  Translation: "when relieved, detached. Proceed to the port in which USS Neversail (BB-99) may be located. On arrival, report to the commanding officer for duty."

Another approach was to use prowords - brief words combining several words into one. My favorite was "UNODIR."  As in: "UNODIR USS NEVERSAIL INTENDS PROCEED HONG KONG LIBERTY." Translation: "unless otherwise directed, USS Neversail intends...."  This required skillful timing. If sent too soon the Commodore might reply directing otherwise. Sent too late (for example, if Neversail is already entering Hong Kong) might bring down the wrath of the gods.

The modern day of satellite communications has doubtless removed some of a commanding officer's former flexibility.

Seventy Years Ago: Battle Of The Santa Cruz Islands

"Halsey's arrival in Noumea sent American morale skyrocketing throughout the region, as did his assurances to General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the Marine commander on Guadalcanal, that the Navy would give the Marines all possible support within its means. Halsey kept his word...."

"On October 23, as the Marines and Americal soldiers repelled a second violent Japanese assault, the Big E and her task force rendezvoused with Hornet east of Espiritu Santo, forming Task Force 61, under Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Halsey, anticipating a Japanese move into the waters northeast of Guadalcanal, ordered Kinkaid to sweep north of the Santa Cruz islands - a small, malaria-infested chain 700 miles north of New Caledonia - to engage the Japanese fleet...."

"Dawn on October 25, then, found the Combined Fleet and Task Force 61 steaming aggressively towards each other, closing range at close to 30 miles every hour. Confrontation was inevitable...."

"Anticipating the Combined Fleet would make a move towards Guadalcanal, Halsey ordered Kinkaid's Task Force 61 - consisting of Enterprise's TF 16 and Hornet's TF 17 - on an aggressive sweep northwest of the Santa Cruz Islands, hoping to outflank the Japanese fleet as it steamed southwards from Truk."

Admiral Kinkaid's two carriers and 169 aircraft were up against Admiral Nagumo's four aircraft carriers and 212 aircraft. Each force found the other the morning of October 26, 1942. By 0900 they had launched strikes.

Details of the ensuing battle are posted on the web site of the Enterprise CV-6 Association at http://www.cv6.org/1942/santacruz/santacruz.htm. The story reads like a novel. The web site's story continues here and here and here.

By the time the battle ended, USS Enterprise was damaged and USS Hornet, the Doolittle raider, was sunk. As of October 26, the US Navy had no operating aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Even so, a numerically inferior force had kept Japan from achieving their goals.

"The Consequences

"Though tactically Santa Cruz was a draw, strategically it was a narrow victory for the Americans. Nagumo's carriers and Kondo's battleships had been turned away from Guadalcanal, giving the Marines and soldiers there some much needed relief. Perhaps more importantly, the destruction of the best Japanese naval aircrews, begun in earnest at Midway, culminated at Santa Cruz. Though plane losses were high on both sides - 74 American and 92 Japanese - the loss of airmen pointed to a Japanese catastrophe. Nearly 70 Japanese aircrews - including a number of squadron leaders - never returned to their carriers at Santa Cruz, while all but 33 American airmen did.

"The first hint of the damage done to Japan's naval airpower was seen the day of the battle, in the feeble afternoon strikes at Hornet. A more telling sign came on November 11, when Enterprise - after quick patching by Sea Bees and the repair ship Vulcan - sortied from Noumea, a full air group on her flight deck, ready to fight.

"The only Japanese carriers in the area - Hiyo and Junyo, both slow converted ocean liners - were well north of Guadalcanal, carefully staying clear of the American planes there. Without planes and the crews to fly them, the enemy's fleet carriers were impotent. Although Enterprise and her task force faced significant threat from ground-based air forces and submarines, the simple fact was this: 15 days after Santa Cruz, an American carrier stood off the Solomons, battered but ready for action, and not a single enemy carrier came forth to challenge her."

Seventy Years Ago: El Alamein, Stalingrad, Guadalcanal, Norfolk

October 23, 1942: North Africa. General Montgomery's 8th Army attacks Germans at El-Alamein. The attack begins with a 1000-gun barrage. After 20 minutes, 30 Corps sends four of its infantry divisions forward into the German minefields on a six mile front. The 8th Australian and 51st Highland Divisions attack toward "Kidney Ridge" while slightly to the south, the New Zealand Division supported by 1st South African Division strike toward the Miteirya Ridge.

Stalingrad: German attacks in the factory district. Heavy fighting. Soviet forces pushed out of 2/3 of the Red October Factory, which is still building T-34 tanks.

Guadalcanal: Japanese forces attempt to cross the Matanikau River. Thrown back with heavy losses.

Convoy US Army forces under command of General George S. Patton, underway from Hampton Roads, Virginia. Destination: North African coast in Morocco.

Seventy Years Ago: South Pacific Area

October 18, 1942, Vice Admiral Robert Lee. Ghormley, Commander, South Pacific Area, was replaced by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey.

Ghormley had been in charge of the Navy/Marine Corps operation to invade Guadalcanal in early August, commanding forces, eventually including Army units, from his headquarters at Noumea. US Navy losses had been especially heavy.

The decision was made by Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander of the Pacific Fleet. He was concerned about Ghormley's pessimism and sought to replace him with a more aggressive and dynamic leader.

Halsey was such a man.

More On Collision

Now we know a bit more about the collision between USS San Jacinto, an Aegis Cruiser and the nuclear submarine USS Montpelier. Montpelier came to periscope depth about 200 yards or less directly ahead of San Jacinto.

At that point, collision was inevitable. The Navy's report disclosed nothing about the damage to Montpelier, but revealed that San Jacinto's sonar dome was "completely depressurized."

The ships had been operating together in an antisubmarine exercise in the Atlantic. What this incident tells me is that both ships are extraordinarily quiet.

Typically, investigations of such collisions put the onus on the submarine to be sure there is no surface ship in the vicinity before coming to periscope depth or surfacing. But what if the surface ship is extremely quiet? Was San Jacinto operating too slowly to be detected? Were the two vessels communicating? Why did San Jacinto not detect the submarine when it was less than a mile away? Lots of questions.

As for the sonar dome, that will be an expensive repair. One of the challenges the Navy faced with the large multi-mode sonar installations beginning with the AN/SQS-26 series of sonars was that the self-noise of water rushing past the dome reduced the sonar's sensitivity. The problem was the steel "window" surrounding the transducer. In 1976 my ship, USS Patterson, received one of the first inflatable rubber sonar domes. This was not a simple modification.

I expect repairs to San Jacinto will prove to be expensive and time consuming.

Collision At Sea

"A Collision At Sea Can Ruin Your Whole Day"

Old Navy Saying

Let's hope there was no serious injury or loss of life. There will be damage to one or more careers, but that is only one of many hazards in a hazardous profession. I wish the Captains and their crews well.

Seventy Years Ago: Battle Of Cape Esperance

Guadalcanal: October 11, 1942. US Marines have a tenuous foothold about three by five miles on the north shore of Guadalcanal, including the growing airbase at Henderson Field, operating the "Cactus Air Force." Repeated Japanese efforts to dislodge the Marines have been unsuccessful.

The Japanese planned another major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for 20 October. They moved two Infantry Divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. From 14 September-9 October, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the 2nd Infantry Division as well as General Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. Warships were used so they could be in and out of Guadalcanal before daylight, when US aircraft could attack effectively.

For two months, Japan owned the sea at night and the US by day. Japan's planned land offensive was driven by the need to protect Japanese ships from US air. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by delivering the troops and equipment to the island and by bombarding the airfield at night.

In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon—commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific—convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley—overall commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific—that the Marines on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on 8 October, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of 13 October.

Ghormley  ordered Task Force 64 (TF 64), consisting of four cruisers (San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and Helena) and five destroyers (Farenholt, Duncan, Buchanan, McCalla, and Laffey) under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships approaching Guadalcanal and threatening the convoy.

Shortly before midnight, October 11, Admiral Scott's force of four cruisers and five destroyers encountered Japanese Admiral Goto's force of three cruisers and two destroyers near Savo Island. During the ensuing melee. Scott lost one destroyer sunk and one cruiser and one destroyer damaged. Admiral Goto lost one cruiser and three destroyers sunk (including two of the convoy destroyers), about 400 killed and 100 captured.

During the sea battle, the Japanese convoy managed to land most of their troops.

It was a far better outcome for the US than the battle of Savo Island two months earlier, but the US Navy still did not know how much better Japanese torpedoes were than our own. Nor had they learned the full extent of Japan's advantage at night using superior optical equipment and well-trained crews.

Those lessons were yet to come. But radar worked better this time.

And the victory was good for morale.

Seventy Years Ago: Guadalcanal From Japan Point Of View

I just came across a really interesting historical article on Japanese plans for Guadalcanal, what they were attempting and why, and the Battle of Savo Island from their point of view. The article makes it plain that senior Japanese officers were consummate professionals.

By comparison with their US counterparts, Japanese Naval Officers had more difficulty coordinating Naval Operations with those of the Army. Unlike Nimitz and Halsey, who moved Army aircraft around as they wished, Japanese Naval Officers had no control over Japanese Army aircraft. This was a serious operational problem.

Another operational shortcoming for the Japanese is that their communications intelligence organization was not nearly as effective as ours. That's why they were caught completely off guard when the Marines stormed ashore on Guadalcanal in August.

It's a long article, but tells a very interesting story.

The Navy Way

For years I have reflected that many of our institutions would work better if they were run like the Navy.

I don't mean by that to have a dictator at the top giving orders that are carried out with unquestioning obedience (the Navy doesn't actually work like that), but to follow the precepts of leadership attributed to John Paul Jones.

I recently came across an interesting post on the United States Naval Institute blog making reference to the John Paul Jones precepts and explaining how they might apply to political discourse. I recommend reading the post here.

Seventy Years Ago: Furthest Axis Advance

There can be any number of opinions as to the REAL turning points of World War II. In the Pacific, I choose the Doolittle raid as the event that changed Japanese prospects. The Battle of Midway is another candidate for turning point. But the failure of Japan to recapture Guadalcanal and consequent pullback in New Guinea made it clear to Japan that they were now on the defensive.

The November 1942 Allied invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), preceded by German failure to control Malta, pointed to the end of German success in North Africa.

By Mid September the Soviet Union had stalled the German advance at Stalingrad, Moscow and Leningrad.

The Winter of 42-43 proved the high water mark of the Axis advance.

When Churchill announced to Parliament in November 1942 that it was perhaps the "end of the beginning" of World War II, it was an apt description.

Seventy Years Ago: Autumnal Equinox In The Pacific

As the days shortened and the nights lengthened to twelve hours plus, Japanese troop-carrying destroyers had more time to deliver reinforcements. Night concealed ships from Douglas Scout Bombers (SBD's). In daylight the SBD's were deadly to Japanese ships.

Seventy Years Ago: Noumea Harbor

September 21, 1942: The troop ships carrying the 27th Air Depot Group to the South Pacific steamed around the point and entered the harbor of Noumea, New Caledonia.

The ships had left San Francisco on September first and crossed the equator ten days earlier, on September 11. The embarked Army Air Forces personnel outnumbered the sailors aboard, so the crossing-the-line ceremony was fairly perfunctory. Even so, King Neptune made his anticipated appearance on each ship.

Master Sergeant Cox, untroubled by motion sickness, whiled away the hours playing cards and rolling dice. It had been a profitable passage. When not involved in games of chance, he stood watch at the guns mounted on the weather deck, so he was in position to see what transpired.

As the ships headed into harbor, he saw buildings burning, fire fighters trying to control the flames. Other ships already at anchor blinked messages at the new arrivals with signal lights. Instead of easing into assigned amchorages, the new arrivals milled about and headed back out to sea.

"Jap air raid," the messages said. "Don't anchor here. They are coming back."

The formation headed back out to sea, looking for the Australian escort ship they had been promised. Sailors and soldiers crowded the rails searching for the ship. "There she is!" One soldier cried out. "Where?"

White caps made it hard to see. They were expecting a destroyer or, perhaps a cruiser. The soldier kept insisting he saw it.

The long Pacific rollers swept by from astern, lifting the troop ships. From the top of the swell, Sergeant Cox suddenly spotted something. It looked like a broomstick popping up out of the ocean and then disappearing below the horizon.

Finally the ship got closer to the "broomstick" and a small hull popped up above the horizon.

Their escort was an Australian patrol vessel. It looked no bigger than a harbor patrol boat. But it had a gun and that was their escort, protecting them from the enemy until arrival at Brisbane five days later.

Seventy Years Ago: Japanese Stop Advance 30 Miles Short of Port Moresby

Japanese troops fighting their way overland toward Port Moresby, halted their advance at Loribawa, withing 30 miles of their objective. The next day, the nearly starving Japanese troops would begin withdrawing back over the Owen Stanly mountains.

They were halted because of the marines holding out on Guadalcanal. Japan planned to complete their conquest of New Guinea after completing their takeover of Guadalcanal.

It never happened.

Ship Misidentification

During the Democratic National Convention, an evening was set aside to honor veterans and recognize their service to the nation. That's always a good thing to do.

But whoever put together the slide show included a dramatic photo of a group of Soviet warships, with what appear to be a formation of US aircraft flying over.

It was a good picture, but it would have been better to have a formation of American warships. Here's the account from the Navy Times.

 

 A bit embarrassing. Shouldn't have happened.

On the other hand, at least no one was killed, as happened in 1974 when the Turkish Air Force sank the Turkish Navy destroyer, TCG Kocatepe.

I've been reading a lot lately about WWII in the Pacific, and such episodes were not unknown. The truth is, identifying warships can be a challenge, even for a trained professional.

Now to the interesting part. The slide that was shown is in silhouette and the antenna arrays are pretty characteristic of Soviet warships. The hull and superstructure of the ships, though, look an awful lot like our Arleigh Burke class Aegis destroyers. There's a good reason for that. After years of study by naval intelligence and the Naval Ships Systems Command, our naval architects decided that the hull form used by the Soviets had much better sea keeping qualities in heavy weather than the shape we had used on destroyers and cruisers since early in the 20th century. So, for our newest combatant ship we borrowed heavily from Soviet Naval Architecture.

How do I know? Some of my friends did the research, and I saw the culmination of it when I worked on the details of the Arleigh Burke class combat system design.

It isn't a big secret, but I don't think the influence of Soviet designs on our ships is widely known. Compare the pictures, and you will see what I mean.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BCGN_Kalinin_1991.jpg

http://www.military-today.com/navy/arleigh_burke_class_l3.jpg

By the way, when it was formed in 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence was formed for the purpose of seeking out and reporting developments in other navies. So we could copy the best. At that time in our history, we intended to modernize, but had not yet begun the "new steel navy." The first four steel warships were not authorized by Congress until 1883. We had a lot to learn about steel plating, assembly, modern steam plants, and large guns.

Why not learn from other navies? we thought then. Still not a bad idea.

Seventy Years Ago: Wasp Sunk; North Carolina Torpedoed

The afternoon of September 15, 1942,  Wasp (CV-7), Hornet (CV-8), North Carolina (BB-55) and 10 other warships were escorting a convoy carrying the 7th Marine Regiment from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal as reinforcements. As duty carrier, Wasp had been launching and recovering aircraft to support the operation.  At about 2:45 in the afternoon, while she was rearming and refueling aircraft with gasoline and munitions exposed, a destroyer spotted three torpedoes headed right for the carrier. Japanese submarine I-19 had fired a spread of six 21-inch type 93 torpedoes at Wasp. At least two hit their target. Of the torpedoes that missed Wasp, one hit North Carolina and one hit the destroyer O'Brien. 

The Japanese submarine torpedo had a range of 5 miles at a speed of 50 knots or 6 1/2  miles at 46 knots. It was the best World War II torpedo of any navy.

Two torpedoes struck Wasp's starboard side almost simultaneously, one near the gasoline storage tanks and the other near the forward bomb magazine. About twenty seconds later, another explosion occurred. Gasoline fires broke out near the athwartships gasoline main on the second deck and low in the ship near ruptured gasoline tanks. Another major fire started forward in the hangar. Gasoline poured freely from ruptured tanks onto the surface of the water. When that gasoline ignited, the forward part of the ship was engulfed in flames. One 5"/38 ready ammunition locker ignited followed by internal explosions. 

 The Captain maneuvered the ship to keep the wind on her starboard quarter to blow the fire away from the undamaged portion of the ship. The Captain attempted to back the ship into the wind for to escape the gasoline fire on the water's surface, but this proved unsuccessful, as gasoline kept pouring from the tanks. 

After a series of heavy explosions of gasoline vapor, loss of fire main pressure and failure of every attempt to bring the fire under control, the Captain ordered "abandon ship" at 3:20 p.m. Abandon ship was completed by 4:00 p.m., by which time Wasp was completely enveloped in flame. 

193 sailors died and 366 were wounded in the attack. 45 planes went down with the ship.

Wasp stubbornly continued to float and was sunk by her escorts that night.
North Carolina returned to Pearl Harbor for repair of a 20 foot hole and was out of action for the rest of the year. O'Brien was temporarily repaired, but her damaged seams opened up a month later and she sank while returning to San Francisco for permanent repair.

With Enterprise (CV-6) damaged by bombs at Eastern Solomons, Saratoga damaged by a torpedo, and Wasp sunk, Hornet was the only carrier left in the South Pacific for six weeks.  Hornet, too, was to be lost in the Battle of Santa Cruz Island on 26 Oct 1942 from air attack. Enterprise was damaged, again, and there were no active fleet carriers in the Pacific until Enterprise returned 12 Nov for the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal with repair parties still aboard and one elevator out of service.

Meanwhile, back on Guadalcanal, Japanese Major General Kawaguchi launched an attack with 3,000 soldiers of his brigade against Marine Lieutenant  Colonel Edson's Ranger force of 850 marines. Kawaguchi lost 850 killed and the marines lost 104.

On September 15, Imperial General Headquarters in Japan  learned of Kawaguchi's defeat and convened an emergency session. The top Japanese army and navy command staffs concluded that, "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war." The results to date began to have a strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific. Army commanders realized that in order to send sufficient troops and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal, they could not at the same time support the major ongoing Japanese offensive on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea. General Hyakutake, with the concurrence of General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within 30 miles of their objective of Port Moresby, to withdraw until the "Guadalcanal matter" was resolved. He prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field.

Seventy Years Ago: Guadalcanal

US Marines on Guadalcanal learned that Japanese forces were regrouping along the Matanikau River, threatening the beachhead and Henderson Field. On September 14, Major General Vandegrift moved a battalion from Tulagi to Guadalcanal and ordered the 7th Marine Regiment from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal.

More than 4,000 marines embarked September 14 in a convoy of transports, escorted by 13 warships, including the carriers Hornet and Wasp and the battleship North Carolina. Marines fought along Bloody Ridge in defense of the beachhead.

Seventy Years Ago: September 9, 1942 - Japanese Bomb Oregon

Pretty incredible for a Japanese aircraft to bomb Oregon, but they did it seventy years ago, September 9, 1942. Here's the story.

Seventy Years Ago: Taking Stock In The Pacific

In September 1942, Japan remains determined to expel the Americans from Guadalcanal. Bloody fighting, both ashore and at sea. Nothing works for Japan, but neither have the Americans clinched the win. On Guadalcanal, it was about half time. Or by a baseball clock maybe approaching time for the seventh-inning stretch. By early September, both sides have runs, hits and errors.

Time to review the pluses and minuses of both sides:

Japan:
Assets -
1. Incredibly effective torpedoes. Far faster, greater range, explosive power and reliability than American torpedoes. Air launched torpedoes have less explosive power, but are equally effective and can be launched in shallow water;
2.  Aggressive submarines. Used against warships in fleet actions, with good effect;
3.  Excellent pilots - especially aircraft carrier fighter pilots;
4.  Superb fighter plane - Mitsubishi  Zero - highly maneuverable, long range, high climb rate, great for dogfighting;
5.  Sailors skilled in night fighting;
6.  Superior optical systems, including gun laying equipment;
7.  Outnumbered US in aircraft carriers at outset, 10-5;

Vulnerabilities:
1.  Poor damage control and firefighting equipment and skills;
2.  Submarines not used effectively against allied shipping;
3.  No effective organization to recover downed pilots and to train replacements to a high enough level;
4.  Aircraft highly maneuverable but not strongly built - no self-sealing fuel tanks (vulnerable to fire) and no armor to protect pilots;
5.  Lost more aircraft than allies from the beginning;
6.  No radar;
7.  By early September had lost 6 aircraft carriers to 2 for US;

United States:
Assets -
1.  Ship board radar;
2.  Ground based radar;
3.  Communications intelligence;
4.  Excellent pilots;
5.  Superb damage control training and equipment;
6.  Incomparable experience in carrier flight operations;
7.  Excellent organization to recover downed pilots;
8.  5"/38 dual purpose gun - war's best anti aircraft artillery;
9.  Two decades of detailed war planning;
10. Excellent and rugged aircraft: e.g. F-4-F slower than Zero but more rugged, climbs more slowly but to higher altitude and dives faster without falling apart;
11. Fleet units and organizations well prepared for war (under Kimmel's leadership);
12. Excellent coordination between Navy, Marine and Army air forces;
13. Skilled at underway replenishment at sea;

Liabilities:
1.  Snafus at high military staff levels in DC - e.g. R.K. Turner;
2.  Snafus in army organization in the field - both Hawaii and Philippines failed to set up effective radar control organization - or for that matter, any organization at all for air defense, even though they had radar equipment for nearly six months;
3.  Torpedoes - inadequate testing - failure to act on fleet reports of torpedo failures for two years;
4.  Inadequate anti aircraft machine guns aboard ship -  1.1" quad mounts kept jamming and hitting power of projectile inadequate;
5.  Staff level in DC failed to allocate enough resources to communications intelligence before the war and let some fleet commanders (R.K. Turner) fail to make effective use after the war. Turner, for example, wouldn't have a Comint support unit on his flagship;
6.  Not enough equipment and ships (during 1920's and early 1930's, US had not built up to the limits of Naval arms limitation treaties);
7. First year of war, US Navy fighting in two oceans with a navy built for one - depended on movements through Panama Canal.

Seventy Years Ago: At Sea In The Eastern Pacific

A hundred miles west of the Farallon Islands, the troop ship's bow rose and fell as it met the swell generated by a storm thousands of miles across the Pacific.  The ship's sailors seemed not to notice.

Embarked soldiers, stomachs upset by days of railroad food, did their best to keep their food down. Not many succeeded during the rough passage across the bar when they left the Golden Gate.

It was even worse now, in poorly-ventilated troop compartments with bunks stacked four high. A steady stream of soldiers sought relief in what they had learned was the head, not the latrine. Many didn't make it in time. They would have liked to get a breath of fresh air, but there were too many troops and too little deck space.

The privileged few who made it to a topside railing learned the hard way not to barf into the wind. Sometimes they had no choice.

A boatswain's mate piped his whistle and said something unintelligible over the announcing system. Time for evening chow. The soldiers already knew, because they had been smelling the odor of greasy pork chops for more than an hour.

Few made it to the mess hall.

My stepfather, newly-promoted Master Sergeant Cox, was one of them. Not bothered in the slightest by the ship's motion, he ate his fill.

Then he stood his watch with the crew of a 4" gun.

Plenty of fresh air.

Seventy Years Ago: Saratoga Torpedoed - Again

August 31, 1942, east of the Southern Solomons, Japanese submarine I-26 put a torpedo into USS Saratoga's starboard side. The 888-foot carrier tried to avoid the torpedo, but couldn't turn in time.

The explosion damaged one of the electrical switchboards and shorted out the ship's turbo-electric propulsion system. By early afternoon, the electricians had jury-rigged enough power to drive the ship at ten knots toward a repair anchorage at Tongatapu. Two weeks later, she left Tongatapu and on 21 September pulled into the Pearl Harbor shipyard for more permanent repairs. She returned to the Solomons area in November.

This was the second time Saratoga had been put out of action by Japanese submarine torpedoes.