In August, 1945, Royal Air Force troops in Burma had received perhaps as many as 140 brand new Spitfires in shipping crates. No longer needed for the war effort, and with faster aircraft coming off the production lines, what to do with them?
Apparently it was decided to bury them in their shipping crates.
Nearly seventy years later, following British abandonment of Burma as a colony and decades of political turmoil, improving relations have led to discovery of some of those aircraft after a sixteen-year search by a British farmer and aviation enthusiast.
There are various versions of the story and a number of curious aspects. For example, apparently the burying was done by the US Army. The project was helped along by the intervention of the British Prime Minister with Myanmar officials.
It is expected that excavation will begin after the first of the year. Only then will the presence of the aircraft be confirmed. The first site excavated will be near the runway at the Yangon (formerly known as Rangoon) international airport. There may be other burial sites as well.
Stand by for further news.
Friday, November 30, 2012
Thursday, November 29, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Battle Of Tassafaronga
Japanese Army forces on Guadalcanal were desperately short of food and on November 26, 1942, radioed pleading for more. The previous three weeks, only submarines had been able to deliver supplies. Each submarine delivered about a days' supply, but the difficulty of offloading and delivering the food through the jungle reduced what reached the troops. The troops were living on one-third rations.
Japan had resorted to submarines because they were unable to rely on surface ships. A combination of US aircraft operating from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, US PT Boats operating from Tulagi and US surface warships had prevented Japanese resupply operations by ship.
The Japanese developed a new plan. Resupply by high speed destroyers carrying floating drums of food and medical supplies. The drums, connected to each other by line, were to be carried on the decks of six destroyers, escorted by two more. The destroyers would approach at high speed, drop the drums overboard and return to base. Soldiers would swim out and recover the drums.
Following the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Admiral Halsey, Commander of the Southern Pacific Command, reorganized his surface warfare forces, forming a new Task Force, TF 67, at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, about 580 miles from Guadalcanal. The Task Force, initially under RADM Kinkaid, was reassigned to RADM Carleton H. Wright on November 28.
TF 67's job: intercept and destroy any Japanese surface force coming to the aid of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.
The U.S. victory at the Battle of Guadalcanal had cost Halsey 18 ships sunk or so badly damaged that extensive repairs were required. With the exception of destroyers, Halsey's only available surface units were the carrier Enterprise, the battleship Washington, and the light cruiser San Diego at Noumea and the heavy cruisers Northampton and Pensacola at Espiritu Santo.
Several other ships were en route to the South Pacific. By 25 November, as intelligence was piecing together a clearer picture of Japanese plans, Halsey had assembled a force adequate to counter the expected offensive. At Nandi in the Fijis lay the carrier Saratoga, the battleships North Carolina, Colorado, and Maryland, and the light cruiser San Juan. The heavy cruisers New Orleans, Northampton, and Pensacola, and the light cruiser Honolulu were stationed at Espiritu Santo. These last two, together with the heavy cruiser Minneapolis which arrived on the 27th, had come from Pearl Harbor. Here also on the 27th were the destroyers Drayton (which had accompanied the Minneapolis), Fletcher Maury, and Perkins.
On 27 November, these 5 cruisers and 4 destroyers at Espiritu Santo were grouped in to a separate task force, Task Force William, under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, with general instructions from Halsey to intercept any Japanese surface forces approaching Guadalcanal. Admiral Kinkaid prepared a detailed set of operational orders for the Force, but, before he could go over them with his captains, he was ordered to other duty. He was replaced by Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright, who had just made port in the Minneapolis.
Task Force William consisted of four heavy cruisers: Minneapolis, New Orleans, Northampton and Pensacola. Admiral Wright was embarked in Minneapolis;
One light cruiser: Honolulu, with RADM Tisdale embarked; Four destroyers: Drayton, Fletcher, Maury, Perkins. USS Fletcher was the fleet's newest and most powerful destroyer. Her CO, Commander William M. Cole, was in charge of the destroyer unit.
On 29 November the Task Force was moored at Espiritu Santo on 12 hours notice for getting underway. Admiral Wright held a conference, attended by Admiral Tisdale and the commanding officers of the 9 ships, at which the operation plan drawn up by Admiral Kinkaid was "briefly discussed."
At 1940 Admiral Wright received orders to prepare to depart with his force at the earliest possible moment, and to proceed at the best possible speed to intercept an enemy group of 6 destroyers and 6 transports which was expected to arrive off Guadalcanal the next night. He directed Task Force WILLIAM to make all preparations necessary to get under way immediately, and advised COMSOPAC that his ships would be ready to sortie at midnight.
Three hours later COMSOPAC ordered Admiral Wright to proceed with all available units, pass through Lengo Channel (between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands), and intercept the Japanese off Tassafaronga on the northwestern shore of Guadalcanal. Later, Admiral Wright received information that enemy combatant ships might be substituted for the transports, or that the Japanese force might consist wholly of destroyers, and that a hostile landing might be attempted off Tassafaronga earlier than 2300, 30 November. He received no further advices respecting the size or composition of the opposing units.
Admiral Wright promptly put into effect, with minor modifications, Admiral Kinkaid's operation plan, and set midnight as the zero hour for his ships to sortie. Actually the destroyers got under way at 2310, the cruisers at 2335. The whole Force cleared the well-mined, unlighted harbor of Espiritu Santo without incident and shaped its course to pass northeast of San Cristobal Island.
Task Force WILLIAM cleared Lengo Channel at 2225 at a speed of 20 knots. Its average speed made good from midnight, 29 November, when it left Espiritu Santo until it entered Lengo Channel at 2140, 30 November, was 28.2 knots. The cruisers steamed in column, 1,000 yards apart, while the destroyers in the van bore 300° T., 4,000 yards from the Minneapolis. The night was very dark, the sky completely overcast. Maximum surface visibility was not over 2 miles.
Admiral Wright had prepositioned sea planes from the cruisers at Tulagi. Their instructions were to take off in time to patrol the area between Cape Esperance and Lunga Point starting at 2200. They carried flares to drop at Admiral Wright's command. The rest of Admiral Wright's plan depended on using the Navy's new SG surface search radar to gain the advantage of surprise. The four destroyers were in the van (ahead), followed by the cruisers steaming in column 1,000 yards apart. Two additional destroyers, Lamson and Lardner, joined the force at 2100, bringing up the rear. Lamson's CO, Commander Abercrombie, was senior to Cole, but had no copies of the plan, no surface radar, and no knowledge of what was going on. He was therefore unable to assume command of the destroyer force.
At 2306, Minneapolis' SG radar picks up two objects off Cape Esperance. At 2316, Cdr Cole, in accordance with the plan, requested permission to launch torpedo attack on enemy formation of 5 ships, distant 7,000 yards.
About 2321, Admiral Wright ordered ships to commence firing star shells (for illumination) and explosive shells. Apparently TF 67 had caught the Japanese by surprise. The force engaged eight Japanese destroyers or cruisers using fire control radar for aiming. After a few minutes, four of the radar targets disappeared from the radar and some were visually seen to explode and sink.
There was some confusion in attempts to correlate ranges and bearings of Japanese ships, but as of 2326, it appeared that TF67 had won a great victory.
At 2327 a Japanese torpedo struck Minneapolis', blowing off her bow. The ship kept firing until her engineering plant failed and lost power. At 2328, New Orleans was torpedoed, losing her bow as far aft as Turret II. At 2329, a torpedo struck Pensacola on the port side aft, the ship erupted in flames, and fire raged for hours. At 2348, Northampton was torpedoed. Despite valiant efforts to save her, she finally sank about 0300.
Thus, within a few minutes, what had seemed a great victory turned into a resounding loss. One US heavy cruiser sunk, three out of action for months, 395 sailors killed.
As it turned out, only one Japanese destroyer was lost and 197 killed.
Even so, TF67 succeeded in preventing Japanese resupply of their troops on Guadalcanal.
The battle revealed continuing shortcomings in the use of radar.
The surface force was not yet aware that reliability problems affecting submarine torpedoes also applied to those launched by surface ships. Corrective action was many months away.
But damage control and firefighting crews performed magnificently. It is almost inconceivable that Minneapolis, New Orleans and Pensacola were saved and lived to fight another day.
The US Navy still did not know how powerful and effective Japanese type 93 surface-launched torpedoes were. Admiral Wright, in his after action report, still thought the sips had been torpedoed by undetected submarines. There were, after all, no Japanese surface ships within what we believed to be torpedo range.
We would not learn of their technological superiority until later in 1943, when intact torpedoes were captured.
Japan had resorted to submarines because they were unable to rely on surface ships. A combination of US aircraft operating from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, US PT Boats operating from Tulagi and US surface warships had prevented Japanese resupply operations by ship.
The Japanese developed a new plan. Resupply by high speed destroyers carrying floating drums of food and medical supplies. The drums, connected to each other by line, were to be carried on the decks of six destroyers, escorted by two more. The destroyers would approach at high speed, drop the drums overboard and return to base. Soldiers would swim out and recover the drums.
Following the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Admiral Halsey, Commander of the Southern Pacific Command, reorganized his surface warfare forces, forming a new Task Force, TF 67, at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, about 580 miles from Guadalcanal. The Task Force, initially under RADM Kinkaid, was reassigned to RADM Carleton H. Wright on November 28.
TF 67's job: intercept and destroy any Japanese surface force coming to the aid of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.
The U.S. victory at the Battle of Guadalcanal had cost Halsey 18 ships sunk or so badly damaged that extensive repairs were required. With the exception of destroyers, Halsey's only available surface units were the carrier Enterprise, the battleship Washington, and the light cruiser San Diego at Noumea and the heavy cruisers Northampton and Pensacola at Espiritu Santo.
Several other ships were en route to the South Pacific. By 25 November, as intelligence was piecing together a clearer picture of Japanese plans, Halsey had assembled a force adequate to counter the expected offensive. At Nandi in the Fijis lay the carrier Saratoga, the battleships North Carolina, Colorado, and Maryland, and the light cruiser San Juan. The heavy cruisers New Orleans, Northampton, and Pensacola, and the light cruiser Honolulu were stationed at Espiritu Santo. These last two, together with the heavy cruiser Minneapolis which arrived on the 27th, had come from Pearl Harbor. Here also on the 27th were the destroyers Drayton (which had accompanied the Minneapolis), Fletcher Maury, and Perkins.
On 27 November, these 5 cruisers and 4 destroyers at Espiritu Santo were grouped in to a separate task force, Task Force William, under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, with general instructions from Halsey to intercept any Japanese surface forces approaching Guadalcanal. Admiral Kinkaid prepared a detailed set of operational orders for the Force, but, before he could go over them with his captains, he was ordered to other duty. He was replaced by Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright, who had just made port in the Minneapolis.
Task Force William consisted of four heavy cruisers: Minneapolis, New Orleans, Northampton and Pensacola. Admiral Wright was embarked in Minneapolis;
One light cruiser: Honolulu, with RADM Tisdale embarked; Four destroyers: Drayton, Fletcher, Maury, Perkins. USS Fletcher was the fleet's newest and most powerful destroyer. Her CO, Commander William M. Cole, was in charge of the destroyer unit.
On 29 November the Task Force was moored at Espiritu Santo on 12 hours notice for getting underway. Admiral Wright held a conference, attended by Admiral Tisdale and the commanding officers of the 9 ships, at which the operation plan drawn up by Admiral Kinkaid was "briefly discussed."
At 1940 Admiral Wright received orders to prepare to depart with his force at the earliest possible moment, and to proceed at the best possible speed to intercept an enemy group of 6 destroyers and 6 transports which was expected to arrive off Guadalcanal the next night. He directed Task Force WILLIAM to make all preparations necessary to get under way immediately, and advised COMSOPAC that his ships would be ready to sortie at midnight.
Three hours later COMSOPAC ordered Admiral Wright to proceed with all available units, pass through Lengo Channel (between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands), and intercept the Japanese off Tassafaronga on the northwestern shore of Guadalcanal. Later, Admiral Wright received information that enemy combatant ships might be substituted for the transports, or that the Japanese force might consist wholly of destroyers, and that a hostile landing might be attempted off Tassafaronga earlier than 2300, 30 November. He received no further advices respecting the size or composition of the opposing units.
Admiral Wright promptly put into effect, with minor modifications, Admiral Kinkaid's operation plan, and set midnight as the zero hour for his ships to sortie. Actually the destroyers got under way at 2310, the cruisers at 2335. The whole Force cleared the well-mined, unlighted harbor of Espiritu Santo without incident and shaped its course to pass northeast of San Cristobal Island.
Task Force WILLIAM cleared Lengo Channel at 2225 at a speed of 20 knots. Its average speed made good from midnight, 29 November, when it left Espiritu Santo until it entered Lengo Channel at 2140, 30 November, was 28.2 knots. The cruisers steamed in column, 1,000 yards apart, while the destroyers in the van bore 300° T., 4,000 yards from the Minneapolis. The night was very dark, the sky completely overcast. Maximum surface visibility was not over 2 miles.
Admiral Wright had prepositioned sea planes from the cruisers at Tulagi. Their instructions were to take off in time to patrol the area between Cape Esperance and Lunga Point starting at 2200. They carried flares to drop at Admiral Wright's command. The rest of Admiral Wright's plan depended on using the Navy's new SG surface search radar to gain the advantage of surprise. The four destroyers were in the van (ahead), followed by the cruisers steaming in column 1,000 yards apart. Two additional destroyers, Lamson and Lardner, joined the force at 2100, bringing up the rear. Lamson's CO, Commander Abercrombie, was senior to Cole, but had no copies of the plan, no surface radar, and no knowledge of what was going on. He was therefore unable to assume command of the destroyer force.
At 2306, Minneapolis' SG radar picks up two objects off Cape Esperance. At 2316, Cdr Cole, in accordance with the plan, requested permission to launch torpedo attack on enemy formation of 5 ships, distant 7,000 yards.
About 2321, Admiral Wright ordered ships to commence firing star shells (for illumination) and explosive shells. Apparently TF 67 had caught the Japanese by surprise. The force engaged eight Japanese destroyers or cruisers using fire control radar for aiming. After a few minutes, four of the radar targets disappeared from the radar and some were visually seen to explode and sink.
There was some confusion in attempts to correlate ranges and bearings of Japanese ships, but as of 2326, it appeared that TF67 had won a great victory.
At 2327 a Japanese torpedo struck Minneapolis', blowing off her bow. The ship kept firing until her engineering plant failed and lost power. At 2328, New Orleans was torpedoed, losing her bow as far aft as Turret II. At 2329, a torpedo struck Pensacola on the port side aft, the ship erupted in flames, and fire raged for hours. At 2348, Northampton was torpedoed. Despite valiant efforts to save her, she finally sank about 0300.
Thus, within a few minutes, what had seemed a great victory turned into a resounding loss. One US heavy cruiser sunk, three out of action for months, 395 sailors killed.
As it turned out, only one Japanese destroyer was lost and 197 killed.
Even so, TF67 succeeded in preventing Japanese resupply of their troops on Guadalcanal.
The battle revealed continuing shortcomings in the use of radar.
The surface force was not yet aware that reliability problems affecting submarine torpedoes also applied to those launched by surface ships. Corrective action was many months away.
But damage control and firefighting crews performed magnificently. It is almost inconceivable that Minneapolis, New Orleans and Pensacola were saved and lived to fight another day.
New Orleans at Tulagi
Minneapolis at Tulagi
The US Navy still did not know how powerful and effective Japanese type 93 surface-launched torpedoes were. Admiral Wright, in his after action report, still thought the sips had been torpedoed by undetected submarines. There were, after all, no Japanese surface ships within what we believed to be torpedo range.
We would not learn of their technological superiority until later in 1943, when intact torpedoes were captured.
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Another Good Piece By Bruce Bartlett
I've been reading articles by Bruce Bartlett recently with a sense of wonder. As in, I wonder when and why he started to make good sense.
Here, he answers that question in an article in The American Conservative.
I admire writers and thinkers who are concerned with policies that work (or could work) instead of personalities or doctrine.
Good for Bruce Bartlett.
As for his revelations about the Murdoch empire - suspicions confirmed.
Here, he answers that question in an article in The American Conservative.
I admire writers and thinkers who are concerned with policies that work (or could work) instead of personalities or doctrine.
Good for Bruce Bartlett.
As for his revelations about the Murdoch empire - suspicions confirmed.
Monday, November 26, 2012
Lincoln - Go See The Movie
We went to see "Lincoln" this afternoon. Everyone should see it. Not because of the great acting, though that was at least serviceable.
See it for the politics.
If you still think that the present exchange of vitriole among American political figures is unusual in our history, the movie should disabuse you of that notion.
The plot is centered on events leading to approval by the House of Representatives of the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery. You might think this would be a slam dunk for Union politicians, especially Republicans. You'd be wrong.
See the movie and find out why.
See it for the politics.
If you still think that the present exchange of vitriole among American political figures is unusual in our history, the movie should disabuse you of that notion.
The plot is centered on events leading to approval by the House of Representatives of the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery. You might think this would be a slam dunk for Union politicians, especially Republicans. You'd be wrong.
See the movie and find out why.
Sunday, November 25, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Nationwide Gas Rationing
There's a war on, you know! The soldiers need gasoline. And rubber is in short supply. November 26 saw nationwide gas rationing.
Take a look here at rationing books, stickers, stamps and rules.
Take a look here at rationing books, stickers, stamps and rules.
Saturday, November 24, 2012
Scratching My Head Over GMO Amendment
I just took a look at the agenda for the Oriental Town Board meeting on December 4. A public hearing has been announced to discuss Growth Management Ordinance amendments addressing Adult Bookstores, Adult Entertainment, Internet Sweepstakes/Electronic Gaming, and Tattoo Parlors.
You can find the proposed texts here. Be sure to check it out soon - postings on the town web site are frequently removed rather quickly.
I'm sure there's a rational explanation for why the town is expending so much effort and concern on this subject, but danged if I can figure it out.
Tony Tharp, one of our erstwhile journalists, has tried to figure it out as well. Here's his take on it.
I could be wrong, but as far as I can tell, there is no place inside the town limits of Oriental that meets all the criteria set forth in the draft ordinances.
On the off chance that I'm wrong, one proposed ordinance measure for internet sweepstakes requires a $5,000 fee for a permit and a $2,500 fee per terminal or connection point, including wireless. The maximum number of terminals allowed is six. That adds up to $20,000 in fees just to get started. Plus a proposed annual tax of $2,500 per business and $500 per gaming machine in operation or stored on the premises. That adds up to $5,500.
By the way, we do not currently tax any business. For the past several years one of our board members repeatedly claimed that our fee for a sign permit ($25) was driving businesses out of Oriental.
Surely someone can explain all of this to me.
You can find the proposed texts here. Be sure to check it out soon - postings on the town web site are frequently removed rather quickly.
I'm sure there's a rational explanation for why the town is expending so much effort and concern on this subject, but danged if I can figure it out.
Tony Tharp, one of our erstwhile journalists, has tried to figure it out as well. Here's his take on it.
I could be wrong, but as far as I can tell, there is no place inside the town limits of Oriental that meets all the criteria set forth in the draft ordinances.
On the off chance that I'm wrong, one proposed ordinance measure for internet sweepstakes requires a $5,000 fee for a permit and a $2,500 fee per terminal or connection point, including wireless. The maximum number of terminals allowed is six. That adds up to $20,000 in fees just to get started. Plus a proposed annual tax of $2,500 per business and $500 per gaming machine in operation or stored on the premises. That adds up to $5,500.
By the way, we do not currently tax any business. For the past several years one of our board members repeatedly claimed that our fee for a sign permit ($25) was driving businesses out of Oriental.
Surely someone can explain all of this to me.
A Notable Passing
I never know how to react when I learn that a contemporary has passed on.
Dean Faulkner was William Faulkner's niece and stepdaughter. I knew who she was when we were both students at Ole Miss. I don't know if she knew me. A friend of mine dated her from time to time.
She was the last living Faulkner. Last year she published a memoir of the Faulkner family. I need to read it.
I'm sorry I'll never have the chance to discuss it with her.
She was a literary figure in her own right.
The end of an era.
Dean Faulkner was William Faulkner's niece and stepdaughter. I knew who she was when we were both students at Ole Miss. I don't know if she knew me. A friend of mine dated her from time to time.
She was the last living Faulkner. Last year she published a memoir of the Faulkner family. I need to read it.
I'm sorry I'll never have the chance to discuss it with her.
She was a literary figure in her own right.
The end of an era.
Hostess Demise
Michael Hiltzik, writing in the Los Angeles Times, makes it pretty clear that Hostess' problems were caused by management, not the unions.
This should come as no surprise to anyone who has studied W. Edwards Deming's insights into quality control. He attributes 85-90 percent of quality control problems in any enterprise to management, rather than workers.
It is clear from Hiltzik's summary, citing chapter and verse, that Hostess' problems could have been resolved long ago by exercising quality control. Instead, they rewarded their top level magement and raided the pension funds.
It's an all too common story.
But it helps keep up the income share of the top decile.
And then there's this observation.
This should come as no surprise to anyone who has studied W. Edwards Deming's insights into quality control. He attributes 85-90 percent of quality control problems in any enterprise to management, rather than workers.
It is clear from Hiltzik's summary, citing chapter and verse, that Hostess' problems could have been resolved long ago by exercising quality control. Instead, they rewarded their top level magement and raided the pension funds.
It's an all too common story.
But it helps keep up the income share of the top decile.
And then there's this observation.
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