Seventy Years Ago: Battle Of Cape Esperance

Guadalcanal: October 11, 1942. US Marines have a tenuous foothold about three by five miles on the north shore of Guadalcanal, including the growing airbase at Henderson Field, operating the "Cactus Air Force." Repeated Japanese efforts to dislodge the Marines have been unsuccessful.

The Japanese planned another major attempt to recapture Henderson Field for 20 October. They moved two Infantry Divisions, totalling 17,500 troops, from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul in preparation for delivering them to Guadalcanal. From 14 September-9 October, numerous Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the 2nd Infantry Division as well as General Hyakutake to Guadalcanal. Warships were used so they could be in and out of Guadalcanal before daylight, when US aircraft could attack effectively.

For two months, Japan owned the sea at night and the US by day. Japan's planned land offensive was driven by the need to protect Japanese ships from US air. The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's planned offensive by delivering the troops and equipment to the island and by bombarding the airfield at night.

In the meantime, Major General Millard F. Harmon—commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific—convinced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley—overall commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific—that the Marines on Guadalcanal needed to be reinforced immediately if the Allies were to successfully defend the island from the next expected Japanese offensive. Thus, on 8 October, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships at New Caledonia for the trip to Guadalcanal with a projected arrival date of 13 October.

Ghormley  ordered Task Force 64 (TF 64), consisting of four cruisers (San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City, and Helena) and five destroyers (Farenholt, Duncan, Buchanan, McCalla, and Laffey) under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott, to intercept and combat any Japanese ships approaching Guadalcanal and threatening the convoy.

Shortly before midnight, October 11, Admiral Scott's force of four cruisers and five destroyers encountered Japanese Admiral Goto's force of three cruisers and two destroyers near Savo Island. During the ensuing melee. Scott lost one destroyer sunk and one cruiser and one destroyer damaged. Admiral Goto lost one cruiser and three destroyers sunk (including two of the convoy destroyers), about 400 killed and 100 captured.

During the sea battle, the Japanese convoy managed to land most of their troops.

It was a far better outcome for the US than the battle of Savo Island two months earlier, but the US Navy still did not know how much better Japanese torpedoes were than our own. Nor had they learned the full extent of Japan's advantage at night using superior optical equipment and well-trained crews.

Those lessons were yet to come. But radar worked better this time.

And the victory was good for morale.