Seventy Years Ago: Naval Battle Of Guadalcanal

For almost three months, Japanese forces had tried mightily to dislodge the Marines from Guadalcanal, without success. Every Japanese effort to reinforce their army forces on the island had been thwarted or at least limited by the US Navy.

Japan had achieved major successes against the US Navy, including submarine attacks on USS Saratoga and battleship North Carolina, under repair at Pearl Harbor. In late October, Japan sank the carrier USS Hornet and thought they might have sunk Enterprise. Now they planned to send a powerful surface force to bombard Henderson Field, where the "Cactus Air Force" of Marine, Navy and Army aircraft continued to operate with deadly effect against Japanese naval forces trying to reinforce Guadalcanal.

The night of November 12/13, 1942, the Japanese bombardment force under Admiral Abe approached the area, passing south of Savo Island, with two battleships, a light cruiser and thirteen escorting destroyers. The battleships were armed with high explosive projectiles to do maximum damage against the aircraft and fuel dumps at Henderson Field. Such projectiles would be of limited use against battleships and heavy cruisers, but Abe expected no opposition.

The Enterprise had not been sunk. She was undergoing urgent repair at the harbor of Noumea.  Her formation was still a powerful force: the fast battleships Washington and South Dakota, the heavy cruiser Northampton, the light cruiser San Diego and six destroyers were protecting her. 

At Espiritou Santo, moreover, Halsey retained Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner's transport units, to conduct another supply run to be completed by 12 November. In his force were seven transports carrying the 1st Marine Aviation Engineer Regiment, the U.S. Army's 182nd Infantry (National Guard) Regiment and supplies to sustain the forces on the island. Turner had a very potent escort: heavy cruisers Portland and San Francisco, light cruisers Helena, Atlanta and Juneau, plus nine destroyers. Turner move his forces in two separate moves, first the Engineers on three transports, with Atlanta and three destroyers as escorts, under command of Rear-Admiral Norman C. Scott, victor at Cape Esperance. Turner himself would take the rest of the forces, with his escorts under command of Rear-Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, former Chief-of-Staff to Admiral Ghormley.       

Halsey had an advantage: advance knowledge from COMINT of Japanese plans. He realized that every US gain to that point was at stake. But he could only get a third of his forces underway in time. Enterprise and her screen, augmented by heavy cruiser Pensacola, departed Nouméa; but they would not arrive in time to stop the Japanese. Admiral Turner's transports reached Guadalcanal in the early hours of 12 November, and commenced unloading rapidly.

The evening of November 12, Turner withdrew his transports with a weak escort force and left the area. He left behind a force combining Admiral Callaghan's forces with those of Admiral Scott, under command of Callaghan, who was two weeks senior to Scott, who had been victorious in the surface engagement at Cape Esperance a month earlier. This may have been a bad choice. Callaghan had no combat experience and no experience or understanding of radar. What he did have was courage.

About 0130 on November 13, Callaghan's force of two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and eight destroyers stumbled across Abe's force of two battleships, a light cruiser and thirteen destroyers.

In a confused and brutal night engagement, both Admiral Scott and Admiral Callaghan died in battle (Scott possibly from USS San Francisco's friendly fire), the US Navy lost two light cruisers and four destroyers. Admiral Abe lost one battleship (Hiei), two destroyers and seven transports. 

Japan did not succeed in landing reinforcements.

But the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was not yet over.