Congressional District Size

Awhile back, I suggested we could improve the responsiveness of Congress by increasing the size of the House of Representatives to the same ratio of Representatives to population as existed when we arrived at the present size of 435.

There is an unratified amendment, the first of the original twelve submitted in 1789, of which the first ten became the Bill of Rights. The eleventh to be adopted became the 27th Amendment, adopted in 1992. The sole remaining amendment is muddled because of a scrivener's error when the amendment was engrossed. As intended by the Congress, it would require a House of Representatives of 6,000 members today. As printed and sent to the states, it would if adopted have no effect on the size of the House.

This comes to mind in light of Nate Silver's recent post on the Electoral College.

The number of citizens represented by each member of the House was a big issue in 1787.There was a widespread belief that the number represented by each member should be no more than 50,000.

Having large districts with long terms of office was thought to be a way to favor the interests of "property" and "respectable" citizens. A smaller number of citizens per representative with shorter terms was thought to favor the common people.

Here's how James Madison explained it:

Should Experience or public opinion require an equal and universal suffrage for each branch of the Government such as prevails generally in the U.S., (then) a resource favorable to the rights of landed and other property, when its possessors become the Minority, may be found in the enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature and a prolongation of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitations practicable on a contracted theater. And although an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason and justice could regain their ascendancy. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres be required for each branch of the Government, the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, and the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice enlarged and by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty of combining and effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U.S. and even most of the individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or contagious passion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader in trampling on the rights of the Minor party.