I am reading Rachel Maddow's new book, Drift, The Unmooring of American Military Power.
I'm not finding it enjoyable - Ms. Maddow hits too many nails right on the head. In particular, the heart of her book reminds me why, after nearly three decades of service in the navy, I decided I could no longer serve the foreign policy and national security policy imperatives of a US administration - that of Ronald Reagan.
As Brutus observes in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, "the evil that men do lives after them..." The Reagan departure from our historical traditions and the policies of every US President in my lifetime, from FDR through Nixon and Carter, is captured in Maddow's book by an exchange between Senator Edward Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1990:
Kennedy: "....do you agree that the president must obtain the approval of Congress in advance before the United States attacks Iraq?"
Cheney: "Senator, I do not believe the president requires any additional authorization from the Congress before committing US forces to achieve our objectives in the Gulf . . . There have been some two hundred times, in our history, when presidents have committed US forces, and on only five of those occasions was there a prior declaration of war. And so I am not one who would argue, in this instance, that the president's hands are tied or that he is unable, given his constitutional responsibilities as commander in chief, to carry out his responsibilities."
This was a pretty breathtaking repudiation of the Constitutional provision that only Congress has the power to declare war.
But what about those two hundred-odd instances of military action without declaring war? Actually, the figure Cheney cited is a bit inflated, because it includes some very minor actions that would not plausibly constitute war.
But the list also includes some very major military undertakings, including the three-year "quasi-war" with France, the two Barbary Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and countless foreign interventions, including the Boxer Rebellion and the Philippine Insurrection.
On close examination, what is striking about the list is that vast majority of such military actions involved the navy and marine corps, not the army - to be more precise, not the War Department.
It seems too simplistic, but prior to 1947, there were two military departments of our government, the Navy Department and the War Department. If a military action involved only the Navy Department (which includes the marines), there never was a declaration of war. Only if the War Department was involved in a foreign action was there ever a declaration of war.
In one other interesting respect, the Constitution treats the Army and Navy differently. Article I, Section 8 lists the powers of Congress, including:
"To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Capture on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy...."
For whatever reason, the Constitution does not include a two year limit on naval appropriations. One could conclude that our founding fathers were deeply suspicious of standing armies, but had no such suspicion of navies. The suspicion of standing armies was also memorably expressed in the Second Amendment to the Constitution.
What undid more than a century and a half of Constitutional practice and tradition concerning military affairs was the Unification of Armed Forces Act of 1947. Since that action, creating the Department of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an independent Air Force, we have yet to sort these issues out satisfactorily.
Pentagon staff officers in my day often shared the observation that "before the Department of Defense, we never lost a war and since then, we have never won one."
Reviewing the history of our very successful operations during World War II, including significant joint Army-Navy undertakings, one can conclude that Unification of the Armed Forces was not the solution to a problem, but rather a solution in search of a problem. Or a solution that created a problem.
Saturday, April 28, 2012
Friday, April 27, 2012
Oriental Comprehensive Plan
Next Tuesday night, May 1, Oriental's Long Range Planning Committee will unveil its draft of a comprehensive plan.
I haven't completely digested the plan, but there are features of it that I like. Here is a link to the Town Board agenda. Click on the second item to see the 24-page draft of the comprehensive plan.
A second item on the agenda that may make attendance worthwhile is that the town attorney, Scott Davis, will provide an update on South Avenue.
I haven't completely digested the plan, but there are features of it that I like. Here is a link to the Town Board agenda. Click on the second item to see the 24-page draft of the comprehensive plan.
A second item on the agenda that may make attendance worthwhile is that the town attorney, Scott Davis, will provide an update on South Avenue.
Thursday, April 26, 2012
Report On The War: Apr 23 1944
Here Is Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King's Report to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox dated April 23, 1944.
The report is worth reading, since it gives an official view of preparation for and conduct of World War II from the standpoint of one of its principal leaders.
My favorite quote from the report is Admiral King's explanation of the Navy's peacetime efforts to meet its responsibilities:
THE fundamental United States naval policy is "To maintain the Navy in
strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to
guard the United States and its continental and overseas possessions."
In time of peace, when the threats to our national security change with the strength and attitude of other nations in the world who have a motive for making war upon us and who are-or think they are-strong enough to do so, it is frequently difficult to evaluate those threats and translate our requirements into terms of ships and planes and trained men. It is one thing to say that we must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the naval strength adequate for that purpose.
In the years following World War I, our course was clear enough-to make every reasonable effort to preserve world peace by eliminating the causes of war and failing in that effort, to do our best to stay clear of war, while recognizing that we might fail in doing so. For a number of years, the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in the foreseeable future appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical position gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of national economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with a comparatively small Navy. Stated in terms of personnel this meant an average of about 7,900 commissioned officers, all of whom had chosen the Navy as a career, and 100,000 enlisted men more or less.
This modest concept of an adequate Navy carried with it an increased responsibility on the part of the Navy to maintain itself at the peak of operational and material efficiency, with a nucleus of highly trained personnel as a basis for war time expansion.
For twenty years in its program of readiness, our Navy has worked under schedules of operation, competitive training and inspection, unparalleled in any other Navy of the world. Fleet problems, tactical exercises, amphibious operations with the Marines and Army, aviation, gunnery, engineering, communications were all integrated in a closely packed annual operation schedule. This in turn was supplemented by special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in the fundamentals of their duties and at the same time give them the background of experience so necessary for sound advances in the various techniques of naval warfare. Ship competitions established for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were climaxed by realistic fleet maneuvers held once a year, with the object of giving officers in the higher commands experience and training in strategy and tactics approximating these responsibilities in time of war.
Our peacetime training operations, which involved hard work and many long hours of constructive thinking, were later to pay us dividends. For example, it would be an understatement to say merely that the Navy recognized the growing importance of air power. By one development after another, not only in the field of design and equipment, but also in carrier and other operational techniques-such as dive bombing-and in strategic and tactical employment, the United States Navy has made its aviation the standard by which all other naval aviation is judged and has contributed its full share to the advances which were to make aviation the sine qua non of modern warfare. It may be stated here, with particular reference to naval aviation, that the uniform success which has characterized our naval air operations is unmistakably the result of an organization which was based on the conviction that air operations should be planned, directed and executed by naval officers who are naval aviators, and that in mixed forces naval aviation should be adequately represented in the command and staff organization.
The report is worth reading, since it gives an official view of preparation for and conduct of World War II from the standpoint of one of its principal leaders.
My favorite quote from the report is Admiral King's explanation of the Navy's peacetime efforts to meet its responsibilities:
The Peacetime Navy
Prior to the War in Europe
In time of peace, when the threats to our national security change with the strength and attitude of other nations in the world who have a motive for making war upon us and who are-or think they are-strong enough to do so, it is frequently difficult to evaluate those threats and translate our requirements into terms of ships and planes and trained men. It is one thing to say that we must have and maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the naval strength adequate for that purpose.
In the years following World War I, our course was clear enough-to make every reasonable effort to preserve world peace by eliminating the causes of war and failing in that effort, to do our best to stay clear of war, while recognizing that we might fail in doing so. For a number of years, the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in the foreseeable future appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical position gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of national economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with a comparatively small Navy. Stated in terms of personnel this meant an average of about 7,900 commissioned officers, all of whom had chosen the Navy as a career, and 100,000 enlisted men more or less.
This modest concept of an adequate Navy carried with it an increased responsibility on the part of the Navy to maintain itself at the peak of operational and material efficiency, with a nucleus of highly trained personnel as a basis for war time expansion.
For twenty years in its program of readiness, our Navy has worked under schedules of operation, competitive training and inspection, unparalleled in any other Navy of the world. Fleet problems, tactical exercises, amphibious operations with the Marines and Army, aviation, gunnery, engineering, communications were all integrated in a closely packed annual operation schedule. This in turn was supplemented by special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in the fundamentals of their duties and at the same time give them the background of experience so necessary for sound advances in the various techniques of naval warfare. Ship competitions established for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were climaxed by realistic fleet maneuvers held once a year, with the object of giving officers in the higher commands experience and training in strategy and tactics approximating these responsibilities in time of war.
Our peacetime training operations, which involved hard work and many long hours of constructive thinking, were later to pay us dividends. For example, it would be an understatement to say merely that the Navy recognized the growing importance of air power. By one development after another, not only in the field of design and equipment, but also in carrier and other operational techniques-such as dive bombing-and in strategic and tactical employment, the United States Navy has made its aviation the standard by which all other naval aviation is judged and has contributed its full share to the advances which were to make aviation the sine qua non of modern warfare. It may be stated here, with particular reference to naval aviation, that the uniform success which has characterized our naval air operations is unmistakably the result of an organization which was based on the conviction that air operations should be planned, directed and executed by naval officers who are naval aviators, and that in mixed forces naval aviation should be adequately represented in the command and staff organization.
WWII: Were We Ready?
The "standard narrative" of US entry into World War II insists that the US wasn't prepared for war.
Balderdash!
I have recently focused on a single event early in the war - the Doolittle raid on Japan, and conclude that our armed forces were amply prepared for war. They would like to have had more stuff, but they had very good stuff and very well-trained people.
The truth is, no general or admiral is ever entirely satisfied with the readiness of forces under his command. In the US Civil War, General George McLellan never felt his forces were ready for battle.
But successful military leaders know that perfect readiness never happens.
The standard narrative extols the Battle of Midway as the turning point of the Pacific War. That was six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Every ship and airplane at the Battle of Midway was already in service at the time of Pearl Harbor.
Assessments of "turning points" are always a bit arbitrary, but I find it striking that Japan actually made no significant advances in the Pacific after the Doolittle Raid of April 18, 1942. (To be sure, the Japanese landed on Guadalcanal in July, but the US landed in August, and the Japanese had to withdraw before year's end.) After the Doolittle raid, Japan withdrew their carrier force from the Indian Ocean to defend their main islands, and moved other forces back to Honshu.
The Japanese operation to capture Midway was, itself triggered by the Doolittle raid. The Japanese high command wanted to make it impossible for the US to conduct similar raids unopposed.
I think that strengthens the case for the joint Army-Navy attack on Japan of April 18, 1942 as the real turning point of the war.
And the US was prepared.
More on this theme later.
Balderdash!
I have recently focused on a single event early in the war - the Doolittle raid on Japan, and conclude that our armed forces were amply prepared for war. They would like to have had more stuff, but they had very good stuff and very well-trained people.
The truth is, no general or admiral is ever entirely satisfied with the readiness of forces under his command. In the US Civil War, General George McLellan never felt his forces were ready for battle.
But successful military leaders know that perfect readiness never happens.
The standard narrative extols the Battle of Midway as the turning point of the Pacific War. That was six months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Every ship and airplane at the Battle of Midway was already in service at the time of Pearl Harbor.
Assessments of "turning points" are always a bit arbitrary, but I find it striking that Japan actually made no significant advances in the Pacific after the Doolittle Raid of April 18, 1942. (To be sure, the Japanese landed on Guadalcanal in July, but the US landed in August, and the Japanese had to withdraw before year's end.) After the Doolittle raid, Japan withdrew their carrier force from the Indian Ocean to defend their main islands, and moved other forces back to Honshu.
The Japanese operation to capture Midway was, itself triggered by the Doolittle raid. The Japanese high command wanted to make it impossible for the US to conduct similar raids unopposed.
I think that strengthens the case for the joint Army-Navy attack on Japan of April 18, 1942 as the real turning point of the war.
And the US was prepared.
More on this theme later.
Wednesday, April 25, 2012
Keynes Was Right
It is worth pointing out that the British economic policies that have led Britain back into recession are exactly the same policies pushed by Congressman Ryan and other Republicans in Congress. What we need, instead, is more government spending to bring us back into prosperity.
I am not the only one who has come to that conclusion. Increasingly, members of the business community are recognizing that austerity is exactly the wrong approach.
Read, for example, this article in Business Insider by its editor, Henry Blodgett. Blodgett explains clearly why austerity doesn't work:
"The reason austerity doesn't work to quickly fix the problem is that, when the economy is already struggling, and you cut government spending, you also further damage the economy. And when you further damage the economy, you further reduce tax revenue, which has already been clobbered by the stumbling economy. And when you further reduce tax revenue, you increase the deficit and create the need for more austerity. And that even further clobbers the economy and tax revenue. And so on."
I am not the only one who has come to that conclusion. Increasingly, members of the business community are recognizing that austerity is exactly the wrong approach.
Read, for example, this article in Business Insider by its editor, Henry Blodgett. Blodgett explains clearly why austerity doesn't work:
"The reason austerity doesn't work to quickly fix the problem is that, when the economy is already struggling, and you cut government spending, you also further damage the economy. And when you further damage the economy, you further reduce tax revenue, which has already been clobbered by the stumbling economy. And when you further reduce tax revenue, you increase the deficit and create the need for more austerity. And that even further clobbers the economy and tax revenue. And so on."
Britain In Recession
Official data released today shows that Britain has slipped into a new recession.
Britain's new recession is not a direct consequence of policies of the European Central Bank, because Britain is not in the Eurozone. It retains its own currency, the pound.
But the Cameron government has been following a policy of economic austerity, insisting that this will lead to economic expansion.
Apparently, not so much.
Actually, Britain's recovery from this recession is worse than its performance in the 1930's following the Great Depression.
Britain's new recession is not a direct consequence of policies of the European Central Bank, because Britain is not in the Eurozone. It retains its own currency, the pound.
But the Cameron government has been following a policy of economic austerity, insisting that this will lead to economic expansion.
Apparently, not so much.
Actually, Britain's recovery from this recession is worse than its performance in the 1930's following the Great Depression.
Tuesday, April 24, 2012
More On The South Avenue Deal
Today's Parks and Rec meeting was good, because attendees asked a number of probing and worthwhile questions. Those interested in taking another look might want to review some earlier observations I made here.
I think my previous post covers most of the issues. I'd be happy to answer any questions anyone may have. Contact me at: cox.d.r@att.net.
I think my previous post covers most of the issues. I'd be happy to answer any questions anyone may have. Contact me at: cox.d.r@att.net.
South Avenue Special Meeting
This morning a special meeting of Oriental's Parks and Recreation Board met at the intersection of Avenue A and South Avenue. According to my sources, some assertions were made that may not be entirely factual, and questions raised to which the answers are available.
For those curious about background details, I recommend a search in this blog site for "South Avenue." I have made a lot of posts, in considerable detail, over the past three years. One post, that shows the survey of the intersection by Dennis Fornes, is worth taking a look at: http://mile181.blogspot.com/2010/06/south-avenue-street-end.html
The pink wedge shows where the pavement curved around to the left from South Avenue. There has been discussion since winning the case, that the town would have to tear up the pavement and return the wedge to the owner of the corner lot.
It ain't necessarily so. So far as I have been able to tell, that curve has existed since at least 1936 and probably from as far back as the 1920's. The public has been using that curve in the road as a right of way all that time. That is more than sufficient time to establish the curve as town right of way by prescription.
The town can certainly abandon that portion of right of way, following a public hearing, just as it can abandon rights of way established by other methods. But there must be a hearing.
More on this set of issues later.
For those curious about background details, I recommend a search in this blog site for "South Avenue." I have made a lot of posts, in considerable detail, over the past three years. One post, that shows the survey of the intersection by Dennis Fornes, is worth taking a look at: http://mile181.blogspot.com/2010/06/south-avenue-street-end.html
The pink wedge shows where the pavement curved around to the left from South Avenue. There has been discussion since winning the case, that the town would have to tear up the pavement and return the wedge to the owner of the corner lot.
It ain't necessarily so. So far as I have been able to tell, that curve has existed since at least 1936 and probably from as far back as the 1920's. The public has been using that curve in the road as a right of way all that time. That is more than sufficient time to establish the curve as town right of way by prescription.
The town can certainly abandon that portion of right of way, following a public hearing, just as it can abandon rights of way established by other methods. But there must be a hearing.
More on this set of issues later.
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