Seventy Years Ago: Pearl Harbor

My earlier posts haven't analyzed what has been frequently characterized as the "failure" of military commanders at Pearl Harbor and the failure of naval and army intelligence.

Over many years of reading the literature, I long ago concluded that the main failures were in military headquarters in Washington. Those failures were suppressed by powerful defenders within the services. To get a more complete picture, I recommend the book And I Was There by RADM Edwin Thomas Layton, completed shortly before his death. 

Layton names names.

Another source I have just found is a brief summary of US Navy and Army intelligence efforts between the wars. It is on the internet, and no doubt will prove ephemeral. I provide a link, because the author's judgements are very similar to my own. Here is the heart of his conclusions:

"It is important to emphasize the lack of any formal distribution procedures to inform responsible fleet commanders of the intelligence information being gleaned from decrypts of Japanese communications.  In the Navy, this was complicated by the self appointed intelligence expert of then Captain Richmond K. Turner known as “Terrible Turner”, the new head of the Navy’s War Plans department of CNO.  The weakness of Admiral Stark as CNO let Turner completely usurp the functions of ONI and DNC to fulfill their responsibilities to properly warn fleet commanders of the impending Japanese actions based on the Purple diplomatic decrypts and other indicators.  More serious war warning messages and a more accurate picture of the current situation as indicated by Japanese decrypts that were advocated by Captain Laurence Stafford as OP-20-G, Admiral Noyes DNC, and the acting Director of Intelligence (DNI), Captain Kirk, were forestalled or greatly watered down by Turner.  One excuse Turner tried to give for such perfunctory warnings was that Pearl Harbor had all the Japanese diplomatic decrypts, which was false.  Earlier, Captain Turner was convinced Japan would only attack Russia and just before Pearl Harbor he convinced Stark that Japan was not ready to attack the U.S. only the British.  The new DNI Theodore S. Wilkinson refused to challenge Turner’s rebuff of a further specific war warning drafted by Captain Arthur H. McCollum on 5 December.  Again on 6 December, Stafford tried again but was dismissed by Noyes so as not to antagonize Turner.  On the Army side, General George G. Marshall and intermediaries vetoed similar requests made by Colonels Rufus S. Bratton and Otis K. Sadtler.  Later, Marshall denied receiving the related decrypts.  As Washington politics go, both Stafford, Bratton and Sadtler were relegated to rather minor posts and discredited, while Noyes and Turner were given prime advancement billets and promotions.  Although General Marshall was held to have been derelict in his duties by the first Army board of inquiry on the Pearl Harbor attack, the subsequent congressional investigation only found Admiral Kimmel and General Short at fault for the Pearl Harbor disaster.  Marshall had the backing of both Secretary of War Stimson and President Roosevelt.  Stimson instigated a fierce campaign to reverse Marshall’s prior dereliction finding.  During the latter hearings, none of Turner’s subordinates would break ranks and reveal Turner’s derelictions due to his great wartime achievements and rank as Vice Admiral.  Only subsequent revelations have verified Turner’s and Marshall’s responsibility for impeding more appropriate and timely warnings urged by intelligence professionals based on Purple decrypts."

So my nominee for the leader most responsible for the surprise at Pearl Harbor is: (drum roll) - Terrible Turner.

Read And I Was There to learn how and when E.T. Layton expressed his displeasure with Turner.