Seventy Years Ago: At Sea Off Tarawa - USS Liscome Bay

From initial action until the end of the battle, it took America's forces 76 hours to conquer the tiny but well-fortified island of Betio at Tarawa. Over 4,500 Japanese perished in the assault. 1,696 Americans lost their lives. Forty percent of Americans killed died the morning of November 23, when a Japanese submarine launched a torpedo, striking Liscome Bay near its store of aircraft ordinance. She sank in 20 minutes, carrying 687 officers and men with her.

The war in the Pacific was still very much a naval war.

Seventy Years Ago: 20-22 November 1943 - Marines On Tarawa

The assault on the island of Betio, Tarawa Atoll, began November 20. Betio, in the Gilberts, was to be a stepping stone to the Marianas, from which new B-29 heavy bombers could attack Japan.

Rear Admiral Tomaniri Sichero, an experienced engineer, had nine months to build elaborate defensive works. He was replaced in command by an experienced combat officer, RADM Keiji Shibazaki. The Japanese had over 4,500 troops in carefully prepared positions.

Attacking forces were the largest invasion force yet assembled in the Pacific: 17 aircraft carriers, 12 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 66 destroyers and 36 transport ships with 35,000 troops.

After a heavy bombardment of the island by aircraft and guns, things began to fall apart when the Higgins boats approached the landing beaches. Tidal predictions were inaccurate and the boats grounded well offshore. Withering Japanese fire killed many marines as they struggled in to the beaches.

It took three days to win the battle for Betio.

Here is an account of the struggle.

The Difficult Is Done At Once; The Impossible Takes A Bit Longer

Some say it was the US Army Corps of Engineers during World War II who adopted the slogan, "the difficult is done at once - the impossible takes a bit longer."

I can't vouch for that, but I can testify that the slogan accurately expresses the attitude of those who went off to that war.

No task is truly impossible.

My father's outfit, the 27th Air Depot Group, was set down in the jungle outside of Port Moresby, New Guinea, with a few bulldozers and a dismantled sawmill. That was in December, 1942. They built their own hangers, barracks, roads, runways, washing machines, and anything else they needed. At the end of the supply line, they dismantled damaged aircraft for spare parts and rebuilt, redesigned and improved the aircraft in their custody.

In October and November of 1943, they mounted sustained air attacks on the main Japanese base at Rabaul. Operation Cartwheel, it was called.

The original goal was to capture the base at Rabaul. By August, the concept changed into a plan to neutralize and bypass Rabaul. By the end of November, General Kenney's 5th Air Force operating from New Guinea and Admiral Halsey's aircraft carriers had neutralized Japanese air forces out of Rabaul.

Seventy Years Ago: November 14, 1943

November 14, 1943  

In a freak accident, President Roosevelt, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Admirals Leahy and King, plus scores of distinguished politicians, and army, naval and air force strategists came under fire while traveling to the the Tehran Conference on board the battleship Iowa. While running a torpedo drill, the US destroyer William D. Porter was targeting the Iowa's #2 magazine, a live torpedo was ejected and headed for the battleship. After maneuvering, the torpedo detonated 1200 feet aft of Iowa in her wake turbulence. When the incident was concluded, Air Force General Hap Arnold leaned over to Fleet Commander Admiral King and asked, "Tell me Ernest, does this happen often in your Navy?"

Seventy Years Ago On The Eastern Front: The Holocaust Is Discovered

Soviet forces advancing against the German Army enter the region of Khazary, a Jewish region, and find all the inhabitants dead.

The eyewitness account here paints a vivid picture of just what that means.

The horror.

Doolittle Raiders Have Last Public Reunion

Every year since 1942, on April 18, the anniversary of the Doolittle raid on Japan by 16 B-25 bombers taking off from the pitching flight deck of USS Hornet, the survivors of the 80 aviators from the raid hold a reunion. They toast those who passed on during the previous year. Among the mementoes possessed by the surviving raiders is a bottle of fine cognac bottled in 1896, the year of General Doolittle's birth. The plan is for the last survivors to open the bottle and toast their departed comrades.

At their annual reunion this year, the four remaining survivors, all in their nineties, decided that this year's reunion was the last public reunion they will hold. Later this year, they will hold a private ceremony at which the 1896 bottle will be opened. Here is the story.

I have written about the Doolittle raid before: here and here and here and here and here. It was one of the most remarkable military operations in history and had an effect far beyond the slight damage it caused to Tokyo. It was, in fact, a game-changer for the entire Pacific war.

The eighty volunteers who pulled it off were no more remarkable than many others in our armed forces at the time of Pearl Harbor, but only trained B-25 crew members had the chance to volunteer.

They did a remarkable thing, but standing behind them were thousands of sailors, engineers, technicians and military planners who made the plan, modified the aircraft, trained the crews to take off from an aircraft carrier, land in China and get back to the US.

The aircrews got the glory, but all these men were in it together. Teamwork. And it was done with airplanes, ships, soldiers and sailors who were already in the service at the time of Pearl Harbor.

Syria And Chemical Weapons - Light At End Of Tunnel?

Today's news seems somewhat hopeful.

It isn't clear how it came about, but it sounds like Secretary of State Kerry may have proposed a settlement believing Syria would refuse - and now both Syria and Russia are jumping through hoops as fast as they can to accept it.

The proposal that Syria turn over its chemical weapons to international control is a good one. It was made even better when Russia suggested the weapons be destroyed under international supervision.

Doing this would resolve a potential dilemma: should there be a strike against Syria's chemical weapons depots? On the one hand, that would be the most justifiable target. On the other hand, attacking the chemical weapons would likely release some very nasty stuff into the Syrian countryside - possibly causing innocent deaths.

President Theodore Roosevelt is often quoted as advising that we "speak softly and carry a big stick."

George W. Bush's neocons seemed to think that meant "shout loudly and hit people over the head with the stick."

Sometimes diplomacy can accomplish wonders, but it is hard work best accomplished behind the scenes.

I hope that's what's going on here.

Syria, Ypres And Chemical Warfare

April 22, 1915, 5:00 pm northeast of Ypres in Belgium:

Dusk was falling when from the German trenches in front of the French line rose that strange green cloud of death. The light north-easterly breeze wafted it toward them, and in a moment death had them by the throat. One cannot blame them that they broke and fled. In the gathering dark of that awful night they fought with the terror, running blindly in the gas-cloud, and dropping with breasts heaving in agony and the slow poison of suffocation mantling their dark faces. Hundreds of them fell and died; others lay helpless, froth upon their agonized lips and their racked bodies powerfully sick, with tearing nausea at short intervals. They too would die later – a slow and lingering death of agony unspeakable. The whole air was tainted with the acrid smell of chlorine that caught at the back of men's throats and filled their mouths with its metallic taste.

—Captain Hugh Pollard, The Memoirs of a VC (1932)

The green cloud that rolled down the shallow incline from the German lines was chlorine gas. Chlorine is heavier than air, and it pours like water, seeking lower ground - like protective trenches and fox holes.

German troops had hauled nearly 6,000 cylinders of chlorine gas weighing 90 pounds each to the front lines and uncapped the cylinders by hand. Some German troops died from the gas, but some 6,000 French and colonial troops perished within ten minutes of the attack. The rest fled along a four mile front, leaving the way open for Germans to advance. They did so gingerly, because the Germans themselves lacked effective protection against the gas and German officers had not assigned enough reserves to the line to exploit a breakthrough.

Near midnight, Canadian troops formed up and attacked the Germans, driving them back and halting the German advance.

This was the first effective use of gas in warfare. Three months earlier on the Russian front, Germany had used gas-filled artillery shells, but it was so cold the poisonous gas froze and did not vaporize.

For the remainder of World War I, both sides continued to develop new and deadlier gases, new methods of delivery and better defense methods.

The US chemical warfare program began just prior to American entry into the war in 1917. The program was directed out of offices and laboratories at American University in Washington, DC. Just a few years ago, gas warfare shells were found buried in a residential neighborhood near American University.

In 1948, when my family lived in a rural area east of Oklahoma City, our next door neighbor was a man who had been gassed in Europe during World War I. Thirty years later, he was still suffering the effects of that attack.

Outside Ypres, large tracts of former agricultural land remain unusable because of the effects of persistent chemical warfare agents.

Since that time, on only a few occasions have nations used lethal chemical warfare agents: Italy in Ethiopia in 1935, Japan in China, Saddam Hussein against Kurds and against Iran. Most uses have been against insurgents or unprotected civilians (like the alleged Syrian attack), though even that is rare.

The non-use of chemical warfare in Europe during World War II is something of a puzzle. One possibility is that the agents are effective only under very specific weather conditions. It is difficult to find such conditions at the right time, especially with a dynamic battlefield. Then there is this:

Stanley P. Lovell, Deputy Director for Research and Development of the Office of Strategic Services, submitted the queston "Why was nerve gas not used in Normandy?" to be asked of Hermann Goering during his interrogation. Goering answered that the reason gas was not used had to do with horses. The Wehrmacht was dependent upon horse-drawn transport to move supplies to their combat units, and had never been able to devise a gas mask horses could tolerate; the versions they developed would not pass enough pure air to allow the horses to pull a cart. Thus, gas was of no use to the German Army under most conditions.

Seventy Years Ago In The Pacific: August 27, 1943 At Nukufetau

Marines (2d Airdrome Battalion) and Seabees (16th Construction Battalion) occupy the atoll at Nukufetau. The purpose is to set up an air base to support offensive operations later in the year against the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Army troops (RCT 172 of 43d Infantry Division) land on Arundel Island, Solomons, for the same purpose. 

Nukufetau (178.375E 8.064S) is an atoll in the Ellice Islands group northwest of Funafuti. It is nine miles (14 km km) long and five miles (8 km) wide. Its reef-enclosed lagoon has just two passes on the northwest, of which the larger is Teafua Pass. Deafatule Pass  to its north is narrow and tortuous. The lagoon is too shallow for large ships. Supplies, therefore, had to be brought in by landing craft from Funafuti. The largest islet, Motolalo, was swampy and heavily vegetated.

Within a month after marines and Seabees came ashore, they had built a 3500' fighter runway (ready 9 October), and later in the month completed a 6100'  bomber runway was completed later in the month.

Seventy Years Ago: WWII In The Pacific - Bombing Kiska August 12, 1943

ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): From Adak B-24's and B-25's fly 26 bombing, strafing, and radar and photo reconnaissance sorties over Kiska. From Amchitka P-40's, P-38's, B-24's, B-25's, and A-24s fly 70 bombing sorties over the island and are joined by B-24's, P-40's, and F-5A's flying 6 reconnaissance and photo sorties. Targets included the runway, harbor and shipping installations, army barracks, and the Rose Hill area. Lost is B-24D 42-40309.

My friend Ray Rundle, a Navy Communications Technician expert in communications intelligence then stationed on Adak, told the Army there were no more Japanese troops on the island. The Army didn't believe him. Army pilots insisted that Japanese troops remained and had fired anti aircraft weapons against Army bombing missions.

In fact, the Japanese troops had evacuated the island under cover of fog on July 28, two weeks earlier.

When the US Army invasion force stormed ashore on August fifteenth, the invaders found three dogs. US Navy Chief of Naval Operations Earnest King reported to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox that all they found were some dogs and freshly brewed coffee. When Knox questioned the report, King responded that Japanese dogs were very clever and knew how to make coffee.

Descendants of the Japanese dogs still lived on Adak when I was stationed there twenty years later. And Ray Rundle, who had been commissioned and promoted to the rank of Navy Lieutenant, had also returned to Adak.

D-Day

Just a reminder that sixty-nine years ago today, Allied troops stormed ashore on the landing beaches of Normandy, establishing a beachhead in France. Less than a year later, Germany surrendered. The United States was at war with Germany about three and a half years from declaration of war to surrender.

Seventy Years Ago: May 17, 1943 In Europe

May 17, 1943, the B-17 Memphis Belle completed twenty-five missions over Europe. They were the first US bomber to complete that number of missions. It was unusual enough that the Army made a documentary featuring Memphis Belle.

Here is a very interesting summary on Brad DeLong's blog.

Seventy Years Ago: Isoroku Yamamoto

April 18, 1943, a squadron of US Army P-38 twin engine fighters took off from Guadalcanal on a 1,000 mile round-trip flight to shoot down a Japanese aircraft taking a very important person to Bougainville. The very important person was Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese Fleet.

Four days earlier, US Navy communications intelligence personnel intercepted a series of messages encoded in the Japanese naval operating code, JN-25. It proved to be a series of communications giving Admiral Yamamoto's precise itinerary for a command inspection tour. The purpose of the tour was to enhance Japanese morale for their next planned offensive operations.

US planners considered what aircraft to assign to the mission. The only aircraft with enough range was the P-38. Eighteen P-38's were assigned to the mission, code-named Vengeance. The planned time of intercept was 09:35.

The four P-38's designated to intercept Yamamoto arrived at 09:34 just as Yamamoto's flight of two Japanese twin-engined aircraft began their descent. The interceptors shot down both aircraft. Yamamoto, in the lead aircraft, perished. Yamamoto's deputy, in the second aircraft, survived.

The mission was an assassination. The assassination succeeded.  Today we would call it a "targeted killing."

Did it shorten the war or make the next two years of warfare easier? Probably not.

Small Wars In US History

Current media attention is focused on the war the United States started with Iraq a decade ago.

I'm reading an interesting book I picked up a couple of weeks ago at the Marine Corps Exchange at Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station: Just and Unjust Wars by Michel Walzer. The book's subtitle is "A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations."

Just war theory focuses on two aspects of warfare: 1) was there a just cause (as in, was it justified or moral to initiate military action or respond with military action) and: 2) was the war conducted in a just manner.

I would say there is another aspect of war that does not strictly fall under just war theory, but it relates: was the war wise?

In the United States we have a fourth recurring question: was the war constitutional? Specifically, critics of particular wars often claim that the war is not legitimate, because Congress did not declare war as specified in the Constitution.

On this latter point, I recommend reading a really interesting military manual: Small Wars Manual United States Marine Corps 1940. The manual is available here. It is a clearly written guide to planning and conducting small wars in all of their variety.

Just read the introduction and it will be clear that what I have written elsewhere is true. Up to the time of World War II, most of our military interventions were conducted by the Department of the Navy. That included some very substantial military undertakings, including our Quasi-War with France during John Adams' administration. In no case was there ever a declaration of war when the conflict involved only the Navy Department.

Only when the War Department was involved in the conflict did the United States ever declare war. That has happened only five times in our history.

The fine line between conflicts involving only the Navy Department and categorized as "small wars" and the more substantial conflicts involving the War Department disappeared with passage in 1947 of the Armed Forces Unification Act.

That act created a constitutional muddle that we have never resolved.

We would be better off to return to a time when the Navy/Marine Corps team did small wars. They knew how to do it. A number of our military interventions would have been more competently planned and conducted if they had followed the 1940 Small Wars Manual of the Marine Corps.

It would save a lot of money, too.   

Seventy Years Ago: New Guinea And Bismarck Sea

They called it "The Battle Of Bismarck Sea," but it wasn't much of a battle.




Following the loss of Guadalcanal, Japan shifted their focus to New Guinea. The plan was to reinforce their airbases at Salamaua and Lae.

A Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transports with an escort of approximately 100 aircraft – assembled and departed from Simpson Harbour in Rabaul 28 February. They planned a route along the north coast, to avoid Allied air cover. Allied air attacks on the convoy at this point would have to fly over New Britain, allowing easy interception from Japanese air bases. But the final leg ran the gauntlet of the Vitiaz Strait.

Allied cryptanalysts decrypted Japanese communications revealing the plan. More than 6,000 Japanese troops were on their way to reinforce Lae. General MacArthur, concerned that the reinforcements would make it impossible for the Allies to advance in New Guinea, ordered General Kenney, Commander of the Fifth Air Force, to attack the convoys.

Beginning March 2, 1943, Allied Air Forces began attacking the Japanese convoy with a mix of light, heavy and medium bombers specially converted and trained to attack shipping, accompanied by 54 fighters.

By end of the day March 4, the Allies had sunk 8 transports and five destroyers, destroyed twenty Japanese aircraft and prevented all but 1200 Japanese soldiers from reaching Lae.

Many of the attacking aircraft flew over the Owen Stanley range from Port Moresby. My father, serving at Port Moresby in the 27th Air Depot group, was subjected to nightly air raids by Japanese aircraft flying from Lae and Salamaua. During the day he put US aircraft back together for new missions.

Drones, War and Moral Hazard

There has been a lot of discussion by talking heads and writing (by writing heads?) recently about drones. And not just against terrorists. It almost sound like our domestic airspace will soon be full of drones.

Let's give some thought to what we are about. I'm not sure that dressing game console operators up in flight suits, paying them "incentive pay" (we used to call it flight pay), calling them "pilots" and giving them hero medals is what we should be doing.

What I think I'm hearing is a lot of relatively naive talk about "killing the bad guys" though it might be couched in more sophisticated verbiage.

In the popular imagination, war is about killing as many of our opponents as possible. In the professional imagination, Karl von Klausewitz was closer to the mark when he explained that "war is politics by other, namely violent means." What he means, is that there must be a point to what we do beyond killing "the bad guys."

War is not completely separate from diplomacy, either. I think presidential scholar Richard Neustadt got it about right a half century ago when he described the task of diplomacy as to convince enough people and the right people on the other side that what you want is what they also want, in order to further their own interest.

Some sources of human conflict are best moderated with deterrence, some with "compellance," and some with negotiation. Wisdom lies in knowing when. And to what end.

Violence, in the long run, is not a way of resolving human conflict. In international affairs, it is at best like the two by four the farmer hits the mule with. "That's to get it's attention," the farmer explains.

Once you get the opponent's attention, maybe it's best to sit down and reason together.

Back to the subject of drones. And moral hazard.

Let me repeat some earlier thoughts.

Economists talk about "moral hazard." This refers to a situation where there is a tendency to take undue risks because the costs are not borne by the party taking the risk. Like financial wizards who take in enormous bonuses just before the crash and leaves it to the rest of the country to pick up the pieces. We should extend the concept to war.

In 1941 and 1942 the attacking forces faced at least as much risk as those being attacked. This was true at Pearl Harbor, at Bataan and Corregidor, in the Coral Sea,  at Midway, and countless other battles.

It is usually not true of the political leaders who order a country to war. They do not bear the risks that face the military forces.

The equation of risk becomes distorted forever when attacks are conducted from halfway around the world by skilled gamers who sit in front of computers and direct robotic drones to destroy targets and people. It is the inhabitants of target areas who bear the risk.

Is this a kind of moral risk we are willing to take?

As a professional military officer, I always wanted to minimize the risk to my own sailors. At what point does this kind of planning cross a moral divide?

Apart from moral considerations, we may need to think about the message we convey. Is the message that our cause is not worth risking an American life? If so, we should say so. But we need to ask ourselves the question - if a cause is not worth dying for, is it worth killing for?

Seventy Years Ago: USS Iowa (BB-61)

 

New York, NY: February 22, 1943. USS Iowa (BB-61) was commissioned at New York Naval Shipyard. The lead ship of the most powerful US battleships ever built, Iowa was a 45,000 -ton ship armed with nine 16-inch/50 caliber guns with a range of up to 24 miles, firing a projectile weighing up to 2,750 pounds. She also carried twenty 40-mm quadruple barrel Bofors anti-aircraft guns and twenty 5-inch/38 caliber dual-purpose guns arranged in twin mounts with a range of about 9 miles against surface targets. In addition, she bristled with 20-mm antiaircraft guns that proved of limited use and were removed right after the war.

Class & type:	Iowa-class battleship
Displacement:	45,000 tons
Length:	887 ft 3 in (270.43 m)
Beam:	108 ft 2 in (32.97 m)
Draft:	37 ft 2 in (11.33 m)
Speed:	33 kn (38 mph; 61 km/h)
Complement:	151 officers, 2637 enlisted
Armament:	1943: 9 × 16 in (406 mm)/50 cal Mark 7 guns 20 × 5 in (127.0 mm)/38 cal Mark 12 guns 80 × 40 mm/56 cal anti-aircraft guns 49 × 20 mm/70 cal anti-aircraft cannons

USS Iowa is the first ship I ever went to sea in  during a midshipman training cruise to Europe during the summer of 1955.

Wind Generators: Department of Defense Data

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Wind Energy And Cherry Point

Two weeks ago the Pamlico County Board of Commissioners and the Pamlico County Planning Board had a joint meeting at the court house to receive a briefing by Cherry Point on wind generation systems. Specifically, Cherry Point briefed on problems for their air operations that are anticipated from wind turbines.

The briefing acknowledged that it is national policy and the policy of the Department of Defense to encourage alternative energy sources. The briefing did not emphasize, as it might have, that Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus has been a leading proponent of alternative energy. 

The main focus of the briefing was how wind turbines adversely affect Marine radar systems and how important radar is to their air operations. The main challenge was how to mitigate those effects.

Unfortunately, Cherry Point officials offered no hope and no prospects of hope for mitigation. "To date," one presentation slide asserts, "no study data is published indicating technology exists to eliminate wind turbine adverse effects on radar."

Not so. There are studies.

A 2008 study by MITRE Corporation, one of DOD's most experienced electronics contractors observed. "There is no fundamental physical constraint that prohibits the accurate detection of aircraft and weather patterns around wind farms. On the other hand, the nation’s aging long range radar infrastructure significantly increases the challenge of distinguishing wind farm signatures from airplanes or weather.

"Progress forward requires the development of mitigation measures, and
quantitative evaluation tools and metrics to determine when a wind farm
poses a sufficient threat to a radar installation for corrective action to be
taken. Mitigation measures may include modifications to wind farms (such
as methods to reduce radar cross section; and telemetry from wind farms to
radar), as well as modifications to radar (such as improvements in processing;
radar design modifications; radar replacement; and the use of gap fillers in
radar coverage).

"There is great potential for the mitigation procedures, though there
is currently no source of funding to test how proposed mitigations work in
practice. In general, the government and industry should cooperate to find
methods for funding studies of technical mitigations. NOAA has an excellent
research plan, but no adequate funding to carry it out.

"Once the potential for different mitigations are understood, we see no
scientific hurdle for constructing regulations that are technically based and
simple to understand and implement, with a single government entity tak-
ing responsibility for overseeing the process. In individual cases, the best
solution might be to replace the aging radar station with modern and flexi-
ble equipment that is more able to separate wind farm clutter from aircraft."
Mitre's conclusion: "This is a win-win situation for national security, both improving our radar
infrastructure and promoting the growth of sustainable energy."


So the problem isn't technology, it is budgets for what may prove to be fairly minor improvements to radars, new procedures, and possibly coatings for turbine blades to reduce their radar cross-sections. I got the distinct impression that the Marine Corps isn't sufficiently concerned to spend any R&D funds fixing their radars. Why should they, if they can achieve the same end at no cost by intimidating state and local government? The only cost would be to retard economic development in Pamlico County and that doesn't cost the Marine Corps a dime.


In her introductory remarks to the meeting, Commissioner Holton emphasized the potential economic development benefits of wind energy to Pamlico County.

Speaking of mitigation, any measure to replace fossil fuel energy sources with non-carbon alternatives such as wind, solar or nuclear, will delay anticipated sea level rise from global warming. That should matter to every resident of Pamlico County and elsewhere in Eastern North Carolina. In my case, I just raised my house three feet to mitigate the effect of storm surge after Irene. But predictions are that the sea level will rise one meter (39 inches) this century. If so, my house is back in the flood waters.

So I am in favor of wind, solar and nuclear power. No single solution - all of the above.

This discussion has been going on for awhile here and here and here and here and here and here.

Not certain I have the whole story, I did more research on the wind farm/radar issues. What I have found is:

1. There is data. Some was reported to the Congress in 2006: www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/WindFarmReport.pdf

2. There is information on what mitigation works.

3. The problems concern two types of radar: Air Defense systems (AD) and weather radar.

4. My reading of the report to Congress is that there is no problem with Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar. The reason for this is that ATC relies not only on direct radar return ("skin paint") but also on transponder beacon returns like IFF. The briefing did not mention this distinction, but the bulk of the briefing was by Cherry Point's ATC expert. I don't know if Marine ATC controllers have the aircraft turn off their IFF or other beacons while training at high speed and low altitude in this region. Maybe they do, but if so, we should be told. Whether to turn it on or off during training ops is a procedural issue.

5. Distance from the affected radar can itself provide the necessary mitigation. The key factor is distance from the radar to the radar horizon - which is a bit further than the unobstructed visible horizon would be. Bottom line is, that for a normal radar height, and a blade tip height of 300 feet, there would be no interference beyond a distance of 30 miles, even without special mitigation. For a blade tip height of 500 feet, the safe distance would be 35 miles. Trouble is, Pamlico County is within either distance. But that only applies to AD radars. For ATC radars, there should be no problem.

So what kind of radar are they talking about? The briefing did not provide enough information for Pamlico County planners and commissioners to develop suitable regulations for wind farms.

Weather radar is a different matter. Here is a pretty good illustration and discussion of the problem: http://www.crh.noaa.gov/mkx/?n=windfarm There is also some discussion of weather radar in the report to Congress. I did not get the impression from the Cherry Point briefing that they are worried about the weather radar.

I'm not sure what to make of it.

I think the county needs more information.

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Duck And Cover!

Yulia Karbysheva, a fourth grade teacher in Chelyabinsk, Russia, saved 44 students in her class from injury by telling them to "duck and cover," the Cold War defensive maneuver from a half century ago. The teacher herself suffered an injury, but not her students. She didn't know what was happening when she saw the brilliant light from the meteorite that landed nearby, but she knew what to do.

Older residents of Chelyabinsk had likely been trained in such protective measures. Chelyabinsk has been a center of defense industry since Joseph Stalin moved huge factories East of the Ural Mountains in 1941 to get them beyond the reach of Hitler's invading armies.

A town of about 45,000 at the outset of World War I, Chelyabinsk experienced rapid growth during Soviet industrialization of the 1930s. Several industrial establishments, including a Tractor Plant and a Metallurgical Plant, were built at this time. Relocation of industries to the Urals in 1941 began a period of rapid expansion. There were several tank factories and plants to manufacture Katysha rockets. The town became known jokingly as "Tankograd" (Tank City). Chelyabinsk was essentially built from scratch during this time.

Later in the 1940's the area around Chelyabinsk (Chelyabinsk Oblast') became a center of nuclear weapons development. It is thought that much of the area has suffered environmental damage from plutonium pollution.

Perhaps the area will now become a center of the meteorite tourism industry.

Seventy Years Ago: The Week That Was

February 8, 1943, Japanese destroyer force (Rear Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro) completes the evacuation of 1,796 troops from Guadalcanal. The next day, February 9, 1943, US Army General Patch announced the end of organized Japanese resistance on the Island.

January 31, 1943, the German headquarters of the 6th Army at Stalingrad surrendered, including Field Marshall Paulus. Remaining scattered units surrendered February 2, ending the siege of Stalingrad.

To the north, on January 18, 1943, The Soviet Union established a land corridor iinto Leningrad, providing some relief for the siege of Leningrad, though it would be another year before the siege was completely broken.

Things were not going so well for the Allies in North Africa, but Germany was no longer able to reliably supply Rommel's forces. Rommel's forces would last for another three months.

There were to be no further Axis advances on any front.