August 24, 1942 - Japanese force of two heavy and one light aircraft carrier, two battleships, sixteen heavy cruisers, twenty-five destroyers, a seaplane tender, four patrol boats and three troop transports, supported by 177 airplanes, approached Guadalcanal. Their intent: destroy the American fleet and expel American forces from the island, recapturing Henderson Field.
They were met by a much smaller American force under Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, consisting of aircraft carriers Saratoga and Enterprise, battleship North Carolina, four heavy cruisers, eleven destroyers and 176 aircraft.
The ensuing battle was the third major aircraft carrier battle of the war. Like Coral Sea and Midway, neither side's ships ever saw the other. The engagement was fought entirely by aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. Enterprise was hit with three bombs and suffered serious damage, though the ship remained able to launch and recover aircraft. Japanese attempts to bomb USS North Carolina were unsuccessful, resulting in only near misses.
Fletcher's 29 warships defeated Yamamoto's 58, sinking light aircraft carrier Ryujo, a destroyer and a troop transport, and heavily damaging one light cruiser and the seaplane tender.
Of more lasting significance, Japan lost 75 airplanes, including 61 scarce and hard to replace aircrew members. The US lost 20 aircraft and 7 aircrew members.
Another victory for Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who bagged his sixth Japanese aircraft carrier in three battles. He only lost two carriers himself.
Why haven't we heard more about Admiral Fletcher? That's a question for another day.
Friday, August 24, 2012
Thursday, August 23, 2012
Bay River
Bad news in today's County Compass concerning Bay River Metropolitan Sewer District and a planned moratorium on new hook ups in the Oriental area starting next month.
I know the issues are complex and the planning and financing of repairs and upgrades present enormous challenges.
Nevertheless, I have thought for some time that the Town of Oriental may have made a mistake when it decided to sell the Town's sewage treatment plant to Bay River. By making that decision, the Town turned over major control over its own future to an entity over which it has only limited influence or control.
Maybe it's time to take another look.
I know the issues are complex and the planning and financing of repairs and upgrades present enormous challenges.
Nevertheless, I have thought for some time that the Town of Oriental may have made a mistake when it decided to sell the Town's sewage treatment plant to Bay River. By making that decision, the Town turned over major control over its own future to an entity over which it has only limited influence or control.
Maybe it's time to take another look.
Seventy Years Ago: The Home Front
The latest Tea Party/Libertarian/Anarchist whine is about the TSA conducting security checks of attendees at a Paul Ryan political event in Florida last weekend.
I never cease to be amazed at the organized paranoia of these people. Just for information, Secret Service, FBI and state and local authorities have been cooperating for over a century in providing security for appearances by presidential and vice presidential candidates. And for presidents. Example: April 14 2005 season's opener in DC of the Washington Nationals. I was there. But I didn't get to see George W. Bush throw out the first ball. Not enough TSA agents and the equipment wasn't reliable. It was the third or fourth inning before I took my seat.
So what was government like when we had a real war?
January 1942: automobile production ended for the duration. Sale of rubber tires to civilians ended. Anyone with more than five tires had to turn in the extras. Steel, copper, and aluminum were placed under wartime controls;
February: Daylight savings time (to conserve energy), rationing of canned meat and fish;
March: Fresh meat, butter and cheese rationed; two ration books issued to every man, woman and child - blue for two pounds of canned fruit and vegetables per month, red for 28 ounces of meat and 4 ounces of cheese per month; shield seaward facing lights within 12 miles of the coast; marriage increased 300% over 1941 (some in expectation of separation, some to avoid the draft); GM produced 28,728 Browning machine guns;
April: Price Control Act - 60% of foods maximum price set at level in March;
May: Iron, more steel, zinc under wartime controls; War Ration Book One issued - the sugar book; gasoline rationing - 2 1/2 gallons per month sugar rationed 1/2 lb. per month; Meat 7 lb., butter, coffee 1 lb. per month; civilian production banned on 136 items, including refrigerators, vacuums, vending machines, small appliances;
June: V-mail to the troops (microfilm);
July: milk, ice and bread delivery switch to horse-drawn wagons; metal products banned;
August: German U-boats sink a ship every four hours;
September: Fair Employment Commission reports 50% of all defense jobs remain closed to Negroes;
October: Meatless Tuesday initiated; draft age lowered to 18;
November: War Labor Board allows employers to raise pay for women 20 cents per hour if necessary to get employees (average 40% less than men); coffee rationing one cup per day;
December: Gasoline rationing with A, B, C stickers 4 gallons per month.
All prices were controlled by the Office of Price Administration.
Rationing ended in 1946.
Popular songs in 1942 include: "Praise the Lord and Pass The Ammunition," based on an incident aboard USS New Orleans during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
No one doubted we were all in the war together.
I never cease to be amazed at the organized paranoia of these people. Just for information, Secret Service, FBI and state and local authorities have been cooperating for over a century in providing security for appearances by presidential and vice presidential candidates. And for presidents. Example: April 14 2005 season's opener in DC of the Washington Nationals. I was there. But I didn't get to see George W. Bush throw out the first ball. Not enough TSA agents and the equipment wasn't reliable. It was the third or fourth inning before I took my seat.
So what was government like when we had a real war?
January 1942: automobile production ended for the duration. Sale of rubber tires to civilians ended. Anyone with more than five tires had to turn in the extras. Steel, copper, and aluminum were placed under wartime controls;
February: Daylight savings time (to conserve energy), rationing of canned meat and fish;
March: Fresh meat, butter and cheese rationed; two ration books issued to every man, woman and child - blue for two pounds of canned fruit and vegetables per month, red for 28 ounces of meat and 4 ounces of cheese per month; shield seaward facing lights within 12 miles of the coast; marriage increased 300% over 1941 (some in expectation of separation, some to avoid the draft); GM produced 28,728 Browning machine guns;
April: Price Control Act - 60% of foods maximum price set at level in March;
May: Iron, more steel, zinc under wartime controls; War Ration Book One issued - the sugar book; gasoline rationing - 2 1/2 gallons per month sugar rationed 1/2 lb. per month; Meat 7 lb., butter, coffee 1 lb. per month; civilian production banned on 136 items, including refrigerators, vacuums, vending machines, small appliances;
June: V-mail to the troops (microfilm);
July: milk, ice and bread delivery switch to horse-drawn wagons; metal products banned;
August: German U-boats sink a ship every four hours;
September: Fair Employment Commission reports 50% of all defense jobs remain closed to Negroes;
October: Meatless Tuesday initiated; draft age lowered to 18;
November: War Labor Board allows employers to raise pay for women 20 cents per hour if necessary to get employees (average 40% less than men); coffee rationing one cup per day;
December: Gasoline rationing with A, B, C stickers 4 gallons per month.
All prices were controlled by the Office of Price Administration.
Rationing ended in 1946.
Popular songs in 1942 include: "Praise the Lord and Pass The Ammunition," based on an incident aboard USS New Orleans during the attack on Pearl Harbor.
No one doubted we were all in the war together.
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Productive And Obstructive Admirals
In previous posts, I have expressed some views about the nation's military leadership and preparedness for war in 1941. As a young boy, I had seen some of the army's preparations with my own eyes.
Looking at contemporary documents from the vantage point of a naval career of my own and the perspective of seven decades, my judgements may carry some weight. I came to know many who served in the Pacific war. Here are some judgements:
Attack On Pearl Harbor:
Was the Pacific Fleet ready for war? You bet. Were the officers and sailors in "peacetime liberty mode?" Not on your life. About ninety percent of the sailors and sixty percent of officers were on board their ships. The first antiaircraft rounds were fired about four minutes after the unexpected attack began. Anyone with a lick of naval experience would say that speaks for crews who were well-trained and ready.
Admiral Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, was charged with preparing that fleet to go on the offensive against Japan. He did so. The navy's successes during the first six months of conflict were accomplished by ships, planes and submarines he prepared for battle.
Admiral Kimmel was not derelict in his duties. It was foolish of Washington to relieve Kimmel of his command, not because it was unjust (though it was), but because it materially hindered the effort to go on the offensive. Case in point: Admiral Pye (who relieved Kimmel December 17th) dithered over orders to the Saratoga task force sent by Kimmel to relieve Wake Island. The force proceeded at twelve knots (so as not to outrun their fleet oiler) instead of proceeding at twenty or twenty-five knots. Result: Japanese got their first and Pye called the force back. The wisdom of this remains controversial. I doubt Kimmel would have held the force back.
How about the Army? The Army on Oahu had early prototype radar sets as early as June, and an officer trained in procedures to replicate British radar successes during the Battle of Britain. The island lacked communications, radar tracking procedures and organization. Only the island commander, General Short, could have provided those resources. The radar equipment could have been used to warn the fleet and Army bases a good forty-five minutes ahead of the attack. Interceptors could have been at altitude ready to pounce on attackers. Ships would have been at general quarters, all guns manned and ready.
As it was, about eight percent of Admiral Nagumo's planes did not return from the two attack waves, and Nagumo feared even heavier losses had he launched a third.
Short didn't do his job and should have been sacked. He would probably have been suitable to run an infantry training base back in the states, but not for front line command.
The Chief of Naval Operations was a smart mediocrity who lacked the breadth and depth needed for the job. He allowed himself to be dominated by his director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who persuaded him to keep vital intelligence information from Kimmel. Turner insisted that HE, and not the Director of Naval Intelligence, had the authority to evaluate intelligence.
Even after Kimmel had been relieved at least in part as a consequence of Turner's actions, Turner did his best to dispute the conclusions of Admiral Nimitz' communications intelligence team in the runup to the Battle of Midway. Had Turner prevailed, the US would have lost at Midway, possibly as badly as at Pearl Harbor.
Later, RK Turner was sent back to sea as commander of the Amphibious Force supporting the invasion of Guadalcanal. Not only was Turner's planning inadequate (he didn't rehearse the landing in enough detail to foresee the difficulty unloading cargo and clearing it off the beach), his lack of clarity in orders to the screening force may have led to the disastrous loss of heavy cruisers at the Battle of Savo Island. It was a fiasco, and Turner was responsible. How so?
1. He didn't bother telling the Officer in Tactical Command, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, of his troubles unloading. As a result, Fletcher withdrew his three aircraft carriers further from the objective area than he might otherwise have done;
2. Unlike other flag officers, Turner refused to have a communicatiions intelligence detachment aboard his flagship. Result: insufficient early warning of Admiral Mikawa's force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one destroyer, who attacked Turner's six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Some of Turner's ships had radar. None of Mikawa's did.
OK, so I don't admire Turner.
Anyone else on my list of screw ups? Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie, Rear Admiral Robert Henry English, and Rear Admiral H.P. Blandy. These were the officers most directly responsible for denying reports of problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and obstructing efforts to test and correct them. Christie was in charge of developing the torpedo, which eventually was found to run ten feet too deep, to have an ineffective magnetic sensor, and to have a defective contact exploder. Permanent fixes were not accomplished until after all three officers were replaced. Blandy went on to have a distinguished career, retiring as an Admiral.
Now for the attaboys:
RADM Charles Lockwood. As Commander Submarines, Pacific, he defied the Bureau of Ordinance, tested the Mark 14 torpedoes and devised fixes;
RADM Willis A. "Ching" Lee, Commander Battleship Division 6 in the Battle of Guadalcanal, 14-15 November, 1942. Used radar at night to destroy Japanese Battleship Kirishima, the only US battleship during World War II to sink an enemy battleship in a "one on one" gunfight. It was Lee's careful but audacious planning as well as his complete understanding of radar that led to the victory;
VADM Frank Jack Fletcher. Never achieved the fame he deserved. No PR. Forces under his tactical command sank six Japanese carriers. Fletcher, a "black shoe" (non-aviator) was the war's most successful carrier task group commander.
I won't mention Leahy, King, Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance. They are too well known.
Looking at contemporary documents from the vantage point of a naval career of my own and the perspective of seven decades, my judgements may carry some weight. I came to know many who served in the Pacific war. Here are some judgements:
Attack On Pearl Harbor:
Was the Pacific Fleet ready for war? You bet. Were the officers and sailors in "peacetime liberty mode?" Not on your life. About ninety percent of the sailors and sixty percent of officers were on board their ships. The first antiaircraft rounds were fired about four minutes after the unexpected attack began. Anyone with a lick of naval experience would say that speaks for crews who were well-trained and ready.
Admiral Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, was charged with preparing that fleet to go on the offensive against Japan. He did so. The navy's successes during the first six months of conflict were accomplished by ships, planes and submarines he prepared for battle.
Admiral Kimmel was not derelict in his duties. It was foolish of Washington to relieve Kimmel of his command, not because it was unjust (though it was), but because it materially hindered the effort to go on the offensive. Case in point: Admiral Pye (who relieved Kimmel December 17th) dithered over orders to the Saratoga task force sent by Kimmel to relieve Wake Island. The force proceeded at twelve knots (so as not to outrun their fleet oiler) instead of proceeding at twenty or twenty-five knots. Result: Japanese got their first and Pye called the force back. The wisdom of this remains controversial. I doubt Kimmel would have held the force back.
How about the Army? The Army on Oahu had early prototype radar sets as early as June, and an officer trained in procedures to replicate British radar successes during the Battle of Britain. The island lacked communications, radar tracking procedures and organization. Only the island commander, General Short, could have provided those resources. The radar equipment could have been used to warn the fleet and Army bases a good forty-five minutes ahead of the attack. Interceptors could have been at altitude ready to pounce on attackers. Ships would have been at general quarters, all guns manned and ready.
As it was, about eight percent of Admiral Nagumo's planes did not return from the two attack waves, and Nagumo feared even heavier losses had he launched a third.
Short didn't do his job and should have been sacked. He would probably have been suitable to run an infantry training base back in the states, but not for front line command.
The Chief of Naval Operations was a smart mediocrity who lacked the breadth and depth needed for the job. He allowed himself to be dominated by his director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who persuaded him to keep vital intelligence information from Kimmel. Turner insisted that HE, and not the Director of Naval Intelligence, had the authority to evaluate intelligence.
Even after Kimmel had been relieved at least in part as a consequence of Turner's actions, Turner did his best to dispute the conclusions of Admiral Nimitz' communications intelligence team in the runup to the Battle of Midway. Had Turner prevailed, the US would have lost at Midway, possibly as badly as at Pearl Harbor.
Later, RK Turner was sent back to sea as commander of the Amphibious Force supporting the invasion of Guadalcanal. Not only was Turner's planning inadequate (he didn't rehearse the landing in enough detail to foresee the difficulty unloading cargo and clearing it off the beach), his lack of clarity in orders to the screening force may have led to the disastrous loss of heavy cruisers at the Battle of Savo Island. It was a fiasco, and Turner was responsible. How so?
1. He didn't bother telling the Officer in Tactical Command, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, of his troubles unloading. As a result, Fletcher withdrew his three aircraft carriers further from the objective area than he might otherwise have done;
2. Unlike other flag officers, Turner refused to have a communicatiions intelligence detachment aboard his flagship. Result: insufficient early warning of Admiral Mikawa's force of five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and one destroyer, who attacked Turner's six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and fifteen destroyers. Some of Turner's ships had radar. None of Mikawa's did.
OK, so I don't admire Turner.
Anyone else on my list of screw ups? Rear Admiral Ralph Waldo Christie, Rear Admiral Robert Henry English, and Rear Admiral H.P. Blandy. These were the officers most directly responsible for denying reports of problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and obstructing efforts to test and correct them. Christie was in charge of developing the torpedo, which eventually was found to run ten feet too deep, to have an ineffective magnetic sensor, and to have a defective contact exploder. Permanent fixes were not accomplished until after all three officers were replaced. Blandy went on to have a distinguished career, retiring as an Admiral.
Now for the attaboys:
RADM Charles Lockwood. As Commander Submarines, Pacific, he defied the Bureau of Ordinance, tested the Mark 14 torpedoes and devised fixes;
RADM Willis A. "Ching" Lee, Commander Battleship Division 6 in the Battle of Guadalcanal, 14-15 November, 1942. Used radar at night to destroy Japanese Battleship Kirishima, the only US battleship during World War II to sink an enemy battleship in a "one on one" gunfight. It was Lee's careful but audacious planning as well as his complete understanding of radar that led to the victory;
VADM Frank Jack Fletcher. Never achieved the fame he deserved. No PR. Forces under his tactical command sank six Japanese carriers. Fletcher, a "black shoe" (non-aviator) was the war's most successful carrier task group commander.
I won't mention Leahy, King, Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance. They are too well known.
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: The Navy's Leaders
In a recent post, I mentioned President Roosevelt's request that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox identify the best 40 admirals in the navy. The list turned out not to be very useful, and Roosevelt's ire at the failure of admirals by February of 1942 to have a significant victory against Japan was a bit misdirected.
Some early errors of omission or commission were beyond the control of the admirals.
Something to keep in mind is the dynamics of the flag officer corps in the navy.
The admirals were all graduates of the US Naval Academy. They had known each other, collaborated and competed with each other since they were teenagers. Naval Academy midshipmen sort themselves out into a pecking order during their plebe year, usually at the age of seventeen or eighteen. The pecking order and the nicknames assigned with them follow them for their entire professional careers.
Of the prominent admirals in World War II, the eldest was Admiral Leahy, class of 1897. Next in line were Admiral Pye, commander of Pacific Fleet battleships and Admiral Earnest King, Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, both from the class of 1901. Others graduated from 1902 through 1908. They knew each other at the Naval Academy and had been both comrades and rivals for more than three decades.
They were intelligent and able men, trained to command. They had different styles of leadership and different strengths and weaknesses.
They did remarkably well.
Some early errors of omission or commission were beyond the control of the admirals.
Something to keep in mind is the dynamics of the flag officer corps in the navy.
The admirals were all graduates of the US Naval Academy. They had known each other, collaborated and competed with each other since they were teenagers. Naval Academy midshipmen sort themselves out into a pecking order during their plebe year, usually at the age of seventeen or eighteen. The pecking order and the nicknames assigned with them follow them for their entire professional careers.
Of the prominent admirals in World War II, the eldest was Admiral Leahy, class of 1897. Next in line were Admiral Pye, commander of Pacific Fleet battleships and Admiral Earnest King, Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, both from the class of 1901. Others graduated from 1902 through 1908. They knew each other at the Naval Academy and had been both comrades and rivals for more than three decades.
They were intelligent and able men, trained to command. They had different styles of leadership and different strengths and weaknesses.
They did remarkably well.
Sunday, August 19, 2012
Seventy Years Ago: Hanging In The Balance
Mid August 1942, Guadalcanal. US Marines have a tentative toehold. August 17, Henderson Field, originally started by the Japanese but completed by the marines, became operational. August 20, USS Long Island, the navy's first escort carrier, delivered 19 Grumman F-4-F Wildcat fighters and 12 SBD Dauntless dive bombers to a point 170 nm SE of Guadalcanal and launched them enroute to Henderson Field. These 31 aircraft formed the nucleus of what was later known as the "cactus air force."
Air resupply and evacuation flights using R-4D's (the navy version of the C-47) began the same day.
USS Long Island proved the concept of conversion of merchant ships to what was referred to as a "baby flattop." CVE's like Long Island would prove to be a great force multiplier in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
Air resupply and evacuation flights using R-4D's (the navy version of the C-47) began the same day.
USS Long Island proved the concept of conversion of merchant ships to what was referred to as a "baby flattop." CVE's like Long Island would prove to be a great force multiplier in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.
Saturday, August 18, 2012
On Winning Battles
"No battle was ever won by spectators, was it?"
George Smiley in The Honourable Schoolboy by John Le Carre
George Smiley in The Honourable Schoolboy by John Le Carre
Friday, August 17, 2012
Mother Goose: Dislikes
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